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  Nigeria’s petroleum industry is the lynchpin of its economy.  While oil has been 
the source of immense wealth for the nation, that wealth has come at a cost.  Nigeria’s main oil-
producing region of the Niger River Delta has experienced tremendous environmental 
degradation as a result of decades of oil exploration and production.  Although there have been 
numerous historical works on Nigeria’s oil industry, there have been no in-depth analyses of the 
historical roots of environmental degradation over the full range of time from the colonial period 
to the present.  This thesis contends that the environmental degradation of Nigeria’s oil 
producing region of the Niger Delta is the direct result of the persistent non-implementation of 
regulatory policies by post-independence Nigerian governments working in collusion with oil 
multinationals.  Additionally, the environmental neglect of Nigeria’s primary oil-producing 
region is directly traceable back to the time of colonial rule.  Vital to this argument is the view 
that the British colonial state created the economic institutions which promoted Nigerian 
economic dependency after independence was achieved in 1960.  The weakness of Nigeria’s 
post-colonial dependent system is exposed presently through the continued neglect of regulatory 
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Oil is the backbone of the Nigerian economy.  The Central Intelligence Agency estimates 
that 95% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings come from oil as well as 80% of the national 
budgetary revenues.
1
  With proven reserves of over 37 billion dollars, Nigeria ranks tenth among 
the largest oil producing nations in the world, and first overall among African nations.   While 
the precious commodity has produced untold wealth for the nation, it has also negatively 
impacted social communities and has been the cause of devastation for the ecological landscape 
of Nigeria’s primary oil-bearing region of the Niger River Delta. Nigeria was colonized by the 
British who occupied the territory from 1900 until 1960 when Nigeria achieved political 
independence.  In the aftermath of political independence the future looked bright for the 
Nigerian economy; however, that optimism would be short lived.  For over half a century 
Nigeria has experienced a level of environmental destruction, as a result of an unregulated oil 
industry, that has left the Niger Delta’s ecology severely polluted and an indigenous population 
in a perpetual state of social discontent. Since the mid-1960s, Nigeria has been beleaguered by 
political instability, military coups, a civil war that lasted for three years, ethnic and sectarian 
religious violence, and massive official corruption.  Indeed, the hopes and aspirations of Nigeria 
for self-sustaining growth have evaporated; Nigeria’s oil wealth has not translated into prosperity 
for the majority of the population.  
This thesis contends that the environmental degradation of Nigeria’s oil producing region 
of the Niger Delta is the direct result of the persistent non-implementation of regulatory policies 
by post-independence Nigerian governments working in collusion with oil multinationals.  
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 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2012), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html#top (accessed May 25, 2012). 
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Nigeria’s inability to regulate the oil industry is a product of its dependent relationship with the 
oil companies.  British colonial policies did not induce the transfer of technology.  The system of 
trade established during the colonial period was fundamentally unbalanced to favor the British 
companies who dominated not only the export of trade goods, but also and more profoundly 
important, controlled the technology needed to exploit Nigeria’s resources efficiently. 
Accordingly, in order to explain Nigeria’s lack of meaningful development, scholars of 
the twentieth century have employed the dependency theory.  The dependency theory was 
advanced in the 1960s by scholars attempting to find reasons for years of political instability, 
social disequilibrium, and economic stagnation in Latin American counties.  It developed out of 
two historic traditions of economic thought: Marxism and Latin American structuralism.  Latin 
American structuralism is associated with the economic development scholars working with the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).  However, the structuralist 
works of the mid-twentieth century with their emphasis on internal economic structures, suffered 
from a lack of detailed and rigorous analysis into the underdevelopment of Latin America.
2
  With 
the proliferation of revolutionary movements across Latin America in the mid-twentieth century, 
practitioners of the dependency school of thought, known as dependistas, utilized this theoretical 
model to supplement former Marxian notions of class conflicts and capitalist expansion.  The 
American economic historian Andre Gunder Frank popularized the dependency theory with his 
seminal work The Development of Underdevelopment published in the mid-1960s.  
Indeed, the introduction of dependency theory offered scholars an alternate analytical 
approach to the persistent underdevelopment experienced by Latin American countries, but more 
                                                 
2
 Joseph L. Love, “The Origins of Dependency Analysis,” Journal of Latin American Studies 22, no. 1 (1990): 143-
168.; Also, Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” in Development and Under-Development The 




significantly, it placed the theories of modernization and imperialism in a larger global context.
3
  
This context was further broadened with the incorporation of large multinational corporations to 
the debate about the underdevelopment of the so-called “Third World.”  Scholars of the 
dependency theory posit that multinationals, backed with massive bankrolls and the control over 
technology, inhibited the growth of weaker economies by exploiting natural resources in a 
manner which fostered unbalanced and dependent trade relationships in the global economic 
system.  Although dependency theory originated among scholars studying the problems 
associated with the Latin American sub-region, by the late 1960s and early 1970s dependency 
analysis began to be applied to the African continent by scholars such as Ann Seidman, Reginald 




This thesis applies a methodological approach framed by the dependency theory.  It 
utilizes the dependency theory to not only place Nigeria’s underdevelopment into broad 
international context, but also to analyze Nigeria’s dependent relationship with the multinational 
oil corporations as the root cause of the lack of enforcement of oil regulations throughout the late 
colonial and post-colonial periods.  While the dependency theory provides an applicable 
framework for this thesis in a general sense, it is nevertheless weak when applied to the 
examination of indigenous Nigerian resistance to colonial rule.   
The dependency theory falls short in explaining individual agency within the context of 
resistance to colonial and post-colonial authoritarian rule.  This is best exemplified by the 
indigenous protest movements against the colonial Richards Constitution during the late colonial 
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 Louis A. Perez, Jr., “Dependency,” The Journal of American History 77, no.1 (1990): 133-142. 
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Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.; also Amin, Samir. Imperialism and Unequal Development. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1977. 
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period as well as with the countless legal endeavors and non-violent resistance movements by 
Niger Delta residents against environmental degradation.  To fill this analytical gap, this thesis 
borrows James Scott’s notion of the “weapons of the weak.”  Scott describes this concept as the 
“everyday forms of peasant resistance - the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry 
and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them.”
5
  Scott’s theory, 
when applied to Nigeria’s situation, elicits an understanding of indigenous resistance to British 
colonial rule, the post-colonial authoritarian Nigerian governments, and the harmful 
environmental impacts of oil operations in the Niger Delta.  While generally ineffectual 
throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods in meaningfully effecting regulatory policies, 
indigenous resistance has increased in significance during the twenty-first century as resistance 
became more forceful and violent with the formation of the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND).  
Further, Nigeria’s post-colonial state in addition to being dependent has maintained the 
economic and political institutions that were created during the colonial period.  As renowned 
African historian Frederick Cooper states in his work Africa Since 1940, “New African 
governments inherited both the narrow, export-oriented infrastructure which developmentalist 
colonialism had not yet transcended and the limited markets for producers of raw material which 
the post-war boom in the global economy only temporary improved.”
6
  In other words, the 
governing bodies of post-independence Nigeria are the “gate-keepers” of Nigeria’s post-colonial 
state, controlling all aspects of interactions between Nigeria and the global economy.   
To be sure, the Nigerian economy at independence in 1960 was still based on producing 
raw materials for foreign markets. Nigeria’s weak position in the world economy made the new 
                                                 
5
 James C. Scott, “Peasant Weapons of the Weak,” in European Imperialism,1830-1930, ed. Alice L. Conklin and 
Ian Christopher Fletcher, 184-189 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 185. 
6
 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past and Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4. 
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nation vulnerable to the interests of multinational corporations.  With regard to Nigeria’s oil 
industry, this thesis further argues that the post-colonial state has been more interested in 
exploration and increased oil production than in creating regulatory policies for the oil 
companies.  Unlike the environmental policies of developed nations with regard to oil 
operations, such as initial environmental impact studies and gas-reinjection acts, Nigeria has 
failed to implement and enforce these regulatory policies.  Environmental degradation has 
destroyed the traditional economic systems of the Niger Delta which was based on fishing and 
agricultural production.  As a result, there has been not only a massive exodus from the rural 
areas to the urban centers, but has also created an army of unemployed youths.  Frederick Cooper 
makes this point poignantly in his book Africa Since 1940 that colonial regimes in certain 
regions in Africa implemented policies that impaired the “ecosystem” thereby diminishing the 
economic opportunities available to the people and as a result “labor reserves” were created.
7
  
Cooper’s model is applicable to the Niger Delta, which has witnessed over the past several years 
the massive destruction of marine resources and arable agricultural land.  It was not until 1988 
that the Nigerian government established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA).  
While FEPA’s creation marks a supposed step forward for Nigerian environmental management 
and policy, the lack of adequate monitoring systems has rendered the agency’s mission 
effectively unfulfilled.
8
    
Scope and Sources 
This thesis covers a period of over one hundred years from c. 1900 when the British 
colonized Nigeria to the present.  Geographically, this work will concentrate on the oil-
producing region of the Niger River Delta.  Although colonization was not ultimately achieved 




 Frynas, Oil in Nigeria 
6 
 
by the British until the turn of the twentieth century, Europeans had established trade 
relationships with the coastal people of southeastern Nigeria since the 15
th
 century.  In 1960, 
Nigeria won its independence from the British, just four years after crude oil was first discovered 
in commercial quantities.  With no regulatory policies in place, the oil industry has been 
responsible for the tremendous ecological damage caused to the main oil-bearing region of 
Nigeria. 
This thesis engages both primary and secondary source material to strengthen the central 
argument of how Nigeria’s post-independence political establishment has allowed multinationals 
to exploit oil resources in an unregulated manner causing severe consequences for the natural 
environments of the Niger River Delta.  Through the use of colonial documents, such as annual 
reports and the personal memoirs of colonial officials, this thesis analyzes the colonial 
institutions which established the conditions for Nigeria’s dependence on foreign technology.  
Furthermore, Nigerian newspapers and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) reports from 
independence in 1960 to the present are employed to illuminate how the oil industry, operating in 
an unregulated fashion, has negatively impacted not only the natural environment but also the 
indigenous population of the main oil-bearing region of the Niger Delta.  Careful attention is 
paid to the use of newspaper articles.  As with all primary sources of a subjective nature, an 
“against the grain” scrutiny is applied when analyzing this source.  The same concern applies to 
the examination of NGO reports as many of these agencies publish reports with blatant agendas.  
Newspaper articles and NGO reports are extremely valuable to this study as a medium for 
understanding the social and economic dimensions of environmental degradation. In addition to 
its primary sources, this thesis utilizes secondary source materials concerning colonial, 
environmental, economic and political histories of Nigeria. The authors of these works vary in 
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professional and academic disciplines ranging from economic historians and political scientists 
to legal scholars and news journalists. 
 
Historiography 
Since oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria over a half century ago, 
historical scholarship has discussed issues relating to the evolution of the oil industry and its 
destructive impact on the environment.  However to date there has been no in-depth study 
focusing on environmental degradation over the full range of time from the colonial period to the 
present.  A general survey of the historiography of the oil industry in Nigeria reveals three main 
phases of scholarly work that span approximately six decades.  There is a palpable optimistic 
view in the earliest scholarship on the oil industry, highlighting the positive fiscal potential of the 
resource for the Nigerian economy.  The early scholarship represents awareness for the 
importance of the oil industry to Nigerians as well as an understanding of how essential it was to 
maintain resource control.  This trend is evident in the work of Scott Pearson who wrote on the 
effects of the oil industry on the Nigerian economy as well as its attempt to regulate it.  His 
work, like other early scholarship, sets out to answer the important question, “[w]hat are the 
recent and likely future impacts on the Nigerian economy of the flow of petroleum-related 
investments in Nigeria?”
9
  A shift in the historiography occurs with the conclusion of the 
Nigerian civil war in 1970.  Nigerian oil historiography, from that point forward, focuses more 
on how the oil industry has negatively impacted Nigerian society and less on its optimistic 
future.  Much of post-civil war scholarship concentrates on the oil shock, the impact of the boom 
and bust on the Nigerian economy, and nationalization.  
                                                 
9
 Scott R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) 
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Themes of oil, the economy, and nationalization continued to be present in the literature 
throughout the 1990s; however, as academic scholarship shifted toward human rights violations 
in the Niger Delta, so did academic focus move toward studies of environmental destruction.
10
  
Indeed, the study of environmental degradation has only really gained scholarly attention in the 
preceding two decades.  Three noticeably diverse phases are apparent within this most recent 
historiographical shift. First, there is a conspicuous concentration on human rights violations and 
the environmental degradation of the Niger River Delta as exemplified by the works of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, Jedrzej Frynas, Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas.
11
  The second phase occurs after 
the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) activists in 1995.  With these executions came copious amounts of literature 
from journalists, NGOs, and documentarians, which contributed to the enlightenment of the 
global community regarding the environmental and social impacts of the oil industry on the 
Niger Delta Region.  The last phase focuses on the Nigerian judicial system and its interaction 




Published in 1990, the pioneering historical monograph of Augustine Ikein, The Impact 
of Oil on a Developing Country, explores the relationship between oil operations and the pattern 
of Nigeria’s national and regional development, and their implications for the oil producing areas 
of the Niger Delta.
13
  Scholarship produced prior to Ikein’s important and seminal study, 
concentrate mainly on the oil industry and the trends in production, markets, revenues, and 
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Genova and Falola, “Oil in Nigeria,” 133-156. 
11
 Ken Saro-Wiwa, Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy, (London, 1992); Jedrzej George Frynas, Oil in 
Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities. (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000). 
Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta, (San 
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 2001) 
12
Genova and Falola, “Oil in Nigeria,” 151-152. 
13




economic growth.  Ikein’s work directs scholars and lay people alike to focus more attention on 
not only the impact of the oil industry on the mineral producing areas but also on the welfare of 
the indigenous populations in those areas.  His work emphasizes a feature of the oil industry in 
Nigeria that, until his study, had been greatly neglected in the historiography: the oil industry’s 
impact on the environment and social community. 
 Sarah Khan’s influential work, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil studies the impact 
of poor resource control and mismanagement of funds on Nigeria’s economy.  Her work is 
among the first to demonstrate the direct relationship between the political economy and 
environmental issues.  The correlation illuminated in her study provides essential context for 
understanding how poorly regulated exploitation of resources can have detrimental effects on the 
ecology of oil producing areas.
14
  In addition to Khan, historian Toyin Falola has also 
contributed works dealing with similar issues of oil and the environment.  Falola has produced an 
abundant amount of research concerning Nigeria’s role in the global oil industry, the history of 
oil in Nigeria, and West African development and decolonization.
15
   
Another major theme presented in Nigerian oil and environmental historiography regards 
development and social unrest.  Daniel Omoweh, V.T. Jike, and Cyril Obi among other scholars 
view the Delta’s ruined environmental condition as being crucial in shaping and restructuring 
social dynamics in both rural and urban areas.  Scholarship regarding development and social 
disequilibrium is responsible for bringing Niger Delta rural underdevelopment from the 
periphery of environmental studies to the center.
16
  Also, the shifting focus of scholars toward 
                                                 
14
 Sarah Ahmad Khan, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
15
ToyinFalola  and Ann Genova. The Politics of the Global Oil Industry, (Westport: Praeger, 2005); ToyinFalola and 
Matthew M. Heaton. A History of Nigeria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
16
 Daniel A. Omoweh, Shell Petroleum Development Company, the State and Underdevelopment of Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta: A study in Environmental Degradation, (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005).; V.T. Jike, “Environmental 
Degradation, Social Disequilibrium, and the Dilemma of Sustainable Development in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria,” 
Journal of Black Studies 34 (2004): 686-710.; Cyril L. Obi, “Oil and the Minority Question,” in The National 
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environmental issues in the early 1990s prompted in-depth ecological studies and human rights 
issues by various Western media agencies and non-governmental organizations.  Among the 
most notable journalists and activists writing on the environment in the Niger Delta are Andrew 
Rowell and Michael Peel, both of whom have numerous published works based on first-hand 
accounts and personal experiences in the Delta Region.
17
 
Although thorough, the historiography of environmental degradation in the oil producing 
area of the Niger Delta has significant shortcomings.  An overwhelming amount of the historical 
literature on Niger Delta environmental degradation discusses the topic within the context of the 
impact of official corruption, social and human rights concerns, and the issue of resource 
control.
18
  The works of Frynas and Saro-Wiwa adequately address the fundamental issues 
associated with the impact of environmental degradation on the Nigerian people, yet both authors 
ignore analysis of the history of environmental degradation.  The scholarship not only neglects to 
examine the historical roots of environmental degradation, but it also fails to explain 
environmental degradation in terms of British colonial policy which among other things 
precluded the transfer of technology to the Nigerian colony.  This policy resulted in Nigeria 
becoming a subordinate partner in the expanding oil industry.  A similar weakness is discernible 
in the historical works related to Nigeria’s political economy and resource control in the oil 
producing region.  Although the works of Khan, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, and 
Falola, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry, focus on the impacts of official corruption on 
                                                                                                                                                             
Question in Nigeria Comparative Perspectives, ed. Abubakar and Said Adejumobi, 97-118 (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2002) 
17
 Andrew Rowell, Green Backlash Global Subversion of the Environmental Movement, (London: Routledge, 
1996).; Michael Peel. A Swamp Full of Dollars Pipelines and Paramilitaries at Nigeria’s Oil Frontier, (Chicago: 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2009) 
18
 This is apparent with Daniel Omoweh’s SPDCThe State and Underdevelopment of Nigeria’s Niger Delta A Study 
of Environmental Degradation, (Trenton: African World Press, Inc. 2005).  While there are many examples of the 
ways in which SPDC is polluting the Delta, the environment takes a backseat to analysis of Shell’s reckless oil 
operations as well as notions of underdevelopment. 
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Nigeria’s political system and its implications for development, their studies are limited only to 
the post-colonial period.  Furthermore, Khan’s study concentrates on the time period between the 
oil boom of the 1970s through the early 1990s and Falola’s work discusses the global politics of 
oil.  While their research is thorough and relevant to their particular arguments, both authors 
essentially approach environmental degradation as a current and compelling problem facing the 
population, never pinpointing or addressing its historical origins.   
Additionally, the issues of underdevelopment and environmental degradation, 
exemplified by the works of Omoweh and Obi, similarly neglect in-depth analysis of its 
historical origins in the oil producing region.  For example, Omoweh’s work, although 
distinguished by its title: A Study in Environmental Degradation, presents only a limited view of 
the origins of Nigeria’s environmental situation.  His work contends that the environmental 
degradation of the Niger Delta began when Shell Petroleum Development Company first 
initiated operations in 1937, yet he never adequately connects environmental destruction to the 
non-implementation of oil regulations by successive Nigerian governments.  This thesis goes 
beyond the convention historiography of Nigeria’s oil industry by undertaking a comprehensive 
examination of environmental degradation throughout the course of Nigeria’s late colonial and 
post-colonial periods using three models, the dependency theory and Frederick Cooper’s notions 
of the “gate-keeper” state and the creation of “labor reserves” as a deliberate policy in certain 
parts of Africa. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This thesis is composed of three chapters divided into two main chronologically based 
phases of Nigerian history.  The first chapter discusses Nigeria’s colonial background.  In 
12 
 
addition to establishing a geographical context, chapter one examines how economic relations 
were dominated by the British colonial state which controlled all aspects of resource exploitation 
and the export trade.  This unbalanced trade relationship gave British companies an advantage 
over Nigerian middleman traders and producers with regard to the terms of trade of cash crops 
such as cocoa, peanuts, and oil palm products.  Chapter one also details the earliest exploratory 
activities for crude oil in the Niger Delta Region as well as historical background on the 
formation of large oil multinationals which operate in the region today.  Also, the earliest 
beginnings of environmental degradation are identified as a result of the non-implementation of 
regulatory policies.  While the colonial era saw a number of legislative acts regarding the 
burgeoning oil industry, the lack of enforcement of these regulations, with regard to 
environmental management, had extremely negative impacts on the natural and social 
environments of Nigeria’s Delta Region. 
Chapter two builds on the preceding analysis to further explore the environmentally 
degraded nature of Nigeria’s Niger Delta from political independence in 1960 to 1988 when 
Nigeria established the first governmental agency with the specific goal of environmental 
protection, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency. This chapter expands on the central 
argument of this thesis that the political establishment of post-independence Nigeria allowed 
multinational oil companies to operate in an unregulated manner.  The political system that was 
put in place by the British on the eve of political independence was deeply flawed.  It was 
characterized by the division of Nigeria into three official regions thus promoting regional 
nationalism and ethnic rivalry.  The tensions created by this system would eventually lead to  the 
intrusion of the military into Nigeria’s political life through a coup in 1965, and then a counter-
coup in 1966, and eventually a civil war from 1967-1970.  During this turbulent political period 
13 
 
the federal government of Nigeria was more interested in oil exploration, production, and oil 
revenues, than in instituting any regulatory policies. Ultimately, the Nigerian post-colonial state 
was a predatory state that was centered on a system of patronage to political supporters who were 
based in the different regions.  For the most part, resources managed by the state were used by 
politicians to promote their narrow interests at the expense of everyday Nigerian men and 
women.   
The third chapter concentrates on the time period from 1988 to the present.  The failure to 
enforce regulations regarding Nigeria’s oil industry has resulted in tremendous consequences for 
the environment and social communities of the Niger Delta region.  The destruction of the 
“ecosystem” has in fact created a lack of viable economic opportunities and has resulted in the 
creation of what Frederick Cooper has called “labor-reserves.”  The diminution of economic 
opportunities has resulted in the emergence a large number of unemployed youths who have 
been a key component of uprisings in the most oil exploited areas. While the resistance 
movements of the 1990s and 2000s have gained the attention of NGOs as well as the global 
community, their protest against the degradation of the environment has continually been 
silenced by the Nigerian state.  Additionally, as the economic and social consequences of 
environmental degradation have intensified, the resistance movements have become more 
aggressive and violent in nature.  The strategies employed by these resistance groups include 
sabotage of oil production facilities and pipelines and the illegal sale of crude oil, or “blood oil,” 
on the black market to fund militant activity. 
14 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter describes the geography of the oil producing areas of the Niger River Delta. 
It also analyzes the political and economic institutions created by the British administration 
during the colonial era from 1900 to 1960.  This chapter argues that the economic and political 
policies instituted by the British led to a post-independence Nigerian economy deeply dependent 
on the technological equipment and expertise of Britain and multinational oil companies. After 
the conquest of Nigeria in the early 1900s, British economic policies were designed to facilitate 
the exploitation of Nigeria’s raw materials.  British colonial policies and institutions, exemplified 
by the Colonial Minerals Ordinance of 1914, supported the monopolistic control of crude oil 
exploration in the Niger Delta.  Because of this, Nigeria as an independent nation would 
transition from colonial rule deficient in the technology and appropriate skill sets to effectively 
exploit its oil resources.  This left Nigeria dependent on foreign economies and multinational oil 
companies which possessed the equipment and technological capability to extract and produce 
Nigeria’s oil resources.  While regulations were passed regarding resource control during the 












Figure 1: Nigeria and West Africa1 
Geographical Context 
With regard to geographical context, it is vital for this particular study to describe the 
environmental sensitivity of the various ecological systems found within the Niger Delta Region.  
Nigeria’s Niger River Delta is one of the largest wetland regions in the world.  Its massive 
70,000 square kilometer area, roughly 27,000 square miles, is made up of fresh and salt water 
swamps, tidal pools, beach ridges, and mangrove forests.
2
  The Niger and Benue Rivers both 
drain into the Delta and approximately 75% of the area where these two immense rivers 
converge is regularly inundated with water.
3
  The physical attributes of the Delta Region have 
been shaped by the nature of the water flow and the type of soil that is deposited.  A combination 
                                                 
1
 Nigeria and West Africa Region, map, http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/NigerDelta_WestAfrica.html. 
2
Ebiegberi Joe Alogoa, A History of the Niger Delta, (Port Harcourt: Doval Ventures Limited, 2005 (1972). 11-13. 
3
Haller, Fossil Fuels, Oil Companies, and Indigenous Peoples, 57. 
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of both these aspects affects the vegetation that grows in the area.  Furthermore, the physical 
features of the Delta Region are divided into three distinct sections, sandy beach ridges, salt 
water swamps, and fresh water swamps.   
 
Figure 2: Nigeria’s Niger Delta- Rivers, States, and Vegetation 4 
The beach ridges consist of many small islands stretching along the coast which vary in 
size from a hundred feet to ten miles in width.  Barrier islands are the youngest portion of the 
Delta and are formed from the coastal currents moving sand along the Niger River distributaries.  
Further inland from the coast, the salt water belt, which is approximately 20 to 25 miles wide, is 
the next distinctive physical feature of the Delta.  This belt is composed of black silt and is 
                                                 
4
 Niger Delta: Rivers, States, Vegetation, map, Urhobo Historical Society, 1999-2012, 
http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/NigerDelta_Rivers.html (accessed August 7, 2012). 
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flooded daily with up to two feet of water during high tide.  Distinct to this section is the red 
mangrove, which appropriately explains the regions nickname, the mangrove forest belt.   The 
last section is the fresh-water swamp.  This area is covered with reddish brown soil that joins 
with the older soil of the mainland Nigeria.   
The fresh-water swamp’s elevation is relatively high above the water level, yet the region 
still floods two months out of the calendar year.  The fresh-water swamp section is where the 
population density is the highest, and farming and other agricultural practices prevails over 
fishing as the main dietary source among local groups.
5
  The environment of this area is 
extremely sensitive and relies on consistency and regularity to maintain environmental balance.  
The geography and the predictability of environmental conditions are central to sustaining the 
way of life of the different ethnic groups living in the Delta.  In many cases it is the geographical 
differences that have historically defined the cultural traits as well as movements and interactions 
of the Delta people.  This ecological system came under significant attack with the introduction 
of oil exploration by small British owned companies to the Niger Delta in 1903.  By 1956 crude 
oil was discovered for the first time in commercial quantities.  This discovery drew many more 




The British abolished the slave trade in 1807, and slavery in its colonial territories in 
1833. With the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the British sought new economic 
opportunities. Britain was the first European nation to industrialize.  Soon, industrialization 
spread to other nations in Europe which led to increased competition for new sources of raw 
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materials as well as new markets in the world system. As a way to organize the process, 
Europeans met in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.  The final official document of the 
conference, the Berlin Act, established the principle of effective occupation.  This would lead to 
the scramble and partition of Africa by European powers.  In order to secure trade opportunities 
along the West African coast, the British in 1885, declared a protectorate over the Niger Delta.  
British expansion and economic interests in Nigeria were “morally justified” as an 
obligation; in Alice Conklin’s words, to “uplift the barbaric native peoples living outside the 
West.”
6
  This justification became known as “the white man’s burden.”  The moral justification 
of “the white man’s burden” directly affected the policy decisions in the British colonial 
territories which included the creation of schools and public services.  This concept states that 
the less “culturally developed” peoples needed the rule of Western colonizers to lift them from 
“barbarism” until they can function on their own in the global community both economically and 
socially. Rudyard Kipling popularized the term in his 1899 poem, “The White Man’s Burden,” 
which was originally written to describe America’s conquest of the Philippine Islands.  Kipling’s 
work became a metaphor for the arrogant and racist view that Western cultural superiority could 
lift Africans out of ignorance and poverty.  Kipling’s views are reflected in the following excerpt 
from his poem: 
Take up the White Man’s Burden- 
The savage wars of peace- 
Fill full the mouth of Famine 
And bid the sickness cease; 
And when you goal is nearest 
The end for others sought, 
Watch sloth and heathen Folly 
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With the Niger Delta under British control, the next step was to secure interests in areas 
which could be reached by navigating the Niger River system, essentially controlling the trade 
along the Niger River.  In an effort to succeed in that objective, the British granted a royal 
charter to George Goldie’s National African Company, later changed to the Royal Niger 
Company (RNC).  The RNC set up legal treaties with local traders along trading routes of the 
Niger and Benue Rivers.  While the treaty zones that were set up helped introduce British 
administrative influence further inland, that objective was ancillary to the primary goal of 
monopolizing the trade along Nigeria’s navigable rivers.  Furthermore, the trade monopoly 
essentially accomplished Britain’s aim of keeping France and Germany from gaining position in 
the lucrative trade.  The mission was a success and less than a decade later, the British declared 
the southern portion of Nigeria as the Niger Coast Protectorate; ultimately by 1900, the whole of 




In 1914, the British colonial government amalgamated the Northern and Southern 
protectorates of Nigeria, which in effect created the colony of Nigeria and established its 
political borders.  With amalgamation the prior two administrations were replaced by a single 
governmental entity, under the rule of the first governor-general of the unified Nigeria, Sir 
Frederick Lugard. According to Lugard, “the scheme of amalgamation adopted in Nigeria was 
designed to involve as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible, while providing for the 
introduction later of such further changes as were either foreseen, but not immediately necessary, 
or might be suggested by future experience.”
9
  In addition, a new Executive Council, which was 
composed of senior officials from the whole of the Nigerian territory, took the place of the prior 
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established Restricted Council.  The Executive Council was made up of both European and 
native community members and was chiefly concerned with issues of shipping, banking, 
commercial, and mining interests.  According to the governor general, “[t]he Executive Council 
[was] an institution of the utmost importance.  It afford[ed] the Governor an invaluable 
opportunity of inviting the criticism and suggestions of the ablest and most experienced of his 
staff, not individually but collectively, when the views of one [were] opposed or confirmed by 
another, weak points [were] detected and new aspects brought to light.”
10
  At the time of the 
amalgamation the new Council’s actions were restricted to the overall review of current events 
while at the same time maintaining awareness of public opinion in regard to changing 
developments of governmental policy. 
The new colonial political structure of Nigeria was divided into two separate spheres, 
which loosely traced the borders of the previous territories of Northern and Southern Nigeria.  
These new spheres were titled the Northern and Southern Provinces and were each headed by a 
Lieutenant-Governor.  Individual Lieutenant-Governors were assisted by a separate Secretariat, 
both of whom reported to the Governor-General.  The Northern Province, which spanned an area 
of 255,700 square miles and had a population of approximately nine and a quarter million 
people, was headed by Lieutenant-Governor Temple C.M.G., who previously held the position 
of Chief Secretary of Northern Nigeria. The new Southern Province, which stretched across a 
more modest area of 78,600 square miles and had a population of approximately seven and three 
quarter million people, was headed by Lieutenant-Governor Boyle C.M.G., who previously held 
the rank of Colonial Secretary of Southern Nigeria.  This new unified system was initially 
constructed to subvert the difficulty associated with applying different sets of laws to each 
separate sphere.   This was a necessary step because of the religious and cultural differences of 





the indigenous populations of the North and South.  It has been recorded in the 1914 annual 
report by Lugard that “[t]he system of land tenure and the prerogative of the Crown in respect to 
lands, the system of taxation, of the Courts of Law, and the methods of Native Administrations 
were fundamentally different; and the adoption of any other method of sub-division, such as had 
been suggested, would therefore have produced initial chaos.”
11
 
 As referenced earlier, the main goal of Governor-General Lugard was to centralize the 
administrative apparatus with as little dislocation as possible.   While amalgamation physically 
combined the different regions of Nigeria into one unified territory, the regions were often 
governed differently utilizing a concept of “divide and rule”.  The North and South were 
fundamentally different and Lugard recognized that the previous administration in southern 
Nigeria, as opposed to that in the North, lent too much power and influence to colonial officers 
with reference to indigenous courts and councils.  In an attempt to remedy the situation, Lugard 
further exercised the colonial model of “divide and rule.”  He established a system of direct 
taxation on the southern indigenous population which he believed sustained the power held by 
traditional chiefs and kings in Nigeria, although the presence of British colonial officials 
continued to be outwardly apparent.  While many reports detailed the impracticality of applying 
a direct taxation system similar to the one established in the North, to the South of Nigeria, Lord 
Lugard went ahead with his decision and essentially transformed the political and economic 
system of the Southern Nigerian Province.
12
  
 With the creation of a workable political system, the British put into place an economic 
system that was designed to facilitate the exploitation of Nigeria’s resources.  To this end, 
between 1900-1930, the British colonial administration in Nigeria created a transport network of 
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railroads, roads, and harbors that opened up the interior of the country to British companies.  The 
colonial administration began construction of a railroad in Lagos in 1896.  By 1924, the railroad 
had connected important areas of raw materials such as the cocoa-growing areas of Ibadan, the 
oil-producing areas of the Southeastern region, the tin mines of the Middle Belt Region, and then 
centers of peanut production in Northern Nigeria.  As a complement to the railroad system, the 
government built roads that were intended to open up more distant areas of cash crop production.  
The government had created approximately 20,000 miles of road in the raw material-rich areas 
of Nigeria by the 1940s.  Additionally, ports and harbors were built in key areas such as Lagos 
and Port Harcourt for exporting raw materials. 
 Cocoa Palm Kernels Palm Oil Peanuts 
Year Long Tons £000 Long Tons £000 Long Tons £000 Long Tons £000 
1900 202 9 85,624 843 45,508 681 599 4 
1905 470 17 108,822 1,090 50,562 858 790 7 
1910 2,932 101 172,907 2,451 76,851 1,742 995 9 
1915 9,105 314 153,319 1,693 72,994 1,462 45,409 1,120 
1920 17,155 1,238 207,010 5,718 84,856 4,677 45,409 1,120 
1925 44,705 1,484 272,925 4,937 128,113 4,166 127,226 2,394 
1930 52,331 1,756 260,022 3,679 135,801 3,250 146,371 2,196 
1935 88,143 1,584 312,746 2,245 142,628 1,656 183,993 2,093 
1940 89,737 1,583 235,521 1,500 132,723 1,099 169,480 1,476 
1945 77,004 2,150 292,588 3,496 114,199 1,894 176,242 2,696 
1950 99,949 18,984 415,906 16,694 173,010 12,072 311,221 15,237 
1955 88,413 26,187 433,234 19,196 182,142 13,151 396,904 23,134 
1960 154,176 36,772 418,176 26,062 183,360 13,982 332,916 22,878 
Figure 3: Principal Exports from Nigeria, 1900-196013 
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The creation of a transport network had two important consequences.  First, it resulted in 
a significant growth of agricultural and mineral production.  Second, it led to an influx of 
European trading companies into the interior of Nigeria.  By the 1950s, Nigeria had become the 
leading producer of oil palm products in the world and the second leading producer of both 
peanuts and cocoa. Although Nigeria’s colonial economy was based predominantly on 
agriculture, the mineral resources of Nigeria were also a vital source of revenue.  The extractive 
industries during the colonial period, such as tin and later crude oil were completely controlled 
by European companies.  These companies did not contribute to industrial education nor did they 
transfer technology to the Nigerian colony.  During the early colonial period the British 
government claimed ownership of Nigeria’s mineral resources.  They took over these rights after 
the Royal Niger Company was stripped of its charter.  Subsequently, European companies were 
granted long term leases to extract Nigeria’s resources.  For example, the Minerals Oil Ordinance 
No. 17 of 1914 reinforced Britain’s monopoly over oil exploration within the borders of their 
territory.  Because of the supremacy of the colonial state, all British legislative acts trumped the 
local customs and conventions of the pre-colonial Chiefdoms, communities, and principalities.
14
  
Consistent with British legislative supremacy, the Minerals Oil Ordinance took precedence over 
all pre-colonial orders and was a vital factor in the evolution of the crude oil industry in Nigeria.  
In addition to the Act affirming control over all Nigeria’s mineral resources, it also prohibited 
any non-British company from conducting oil operations within the territory.   
 
Multinational Oil Companies in the Delta 
Initial exploratory activities for crude oil began in Nigeria in 1903 by small, British 
owned oil companies. During the early years, little attention was given to Nigeria as a destination 
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for exploration because the British government’s oil investments were mostly concentrated in 
Eastern Europe and the Americas where there were already vast quantities of proven reserves.  
When British owned companies began exploring for oil in Nigeria, the global supply of crude oil 
far outweighed the demand.  However, the market began to shift as technological innovations 
such as the internal combustion engine facilitated the expansion of the automobile industry.  
Consequently, the market for crude oil expanded outside of its traditional use as an illuminating 
oil and lubricant and by 1914 petroleum and fuel oil surpassed kerosene with nearly 64 percent 
of all refined crude oil products.
15
  This figure rose steadily over the following years as the 
popularity of motor vehicles, oil burning locomotives and naval and merchant vessels increased. 
 Early in the twentieth century minor attempts at oil exploration were conducted by 
companies such as Nigeria Properties, the Nigeria and West African Development Syndicate, 
and the Northern Nigeria Exploration Syndicate; however, little initial success was recorded 
from these businesses.
16
  This trend changed when the first serious exploratory undertaking in 
Nigeria was coordinated by John Simon Bergheim and the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation.  
Simon Bergheim gained valuable experience during his stint in the oil producing regions of 
Galicia and Romania.  From that experience he eventually became co-founder and co-owner of 
the Galizisch Karpathen-Petroleum Actiengesellschaft.  The Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a 
small British-registered company, was founded in November 1905 with the key objective of 
obtaining exploratory rights within the Nigerian territory.
17
  In 1906, Bergheim secured a 
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significant loan from the British Admiralty and the colonial office for oil exploration in the 
southern region of Nigeria.  The concessionary area in which the Nigerian Bitumen 
Corporation’s operations expanded was in the surrounding area of the Lekki Lagoon, located in 
the south of Nigeria and adjacent to the operations of the Northern Nigeria Syndicate.
18
 
 With funding from the British Admiralty and the colonial office, the Nigerian Bitumen 
Corporation commenced operations in 1906, under the managing supervision of Frank Drader.  
Like Bergheim, Drader gained considerable oil experience from working in active fields in 
Galicia as well as Canada.  From the onset, the exploratory operations had a negative impact on 
the natural environment of the Lekki Lagoon area; crude oil exploration brought with it major 
disturbances to the local ecology.  Immense tracts of land were cleared to create space for 
dwellings to be constructed for workers.  Also, large areas of land were leveled to make room for 
drill sites as well as for transportation infrastructure such as roads and tramways.  The 
development of infrastructure in regions in which the oil companies were operating, however, 
was geared toward a more efficient way to export rather than to enhance the living conditions of 
the local population.  In addition to the environmental destruction caused by land clearing 
techniques, there was an untold amount of pollution to the waterways from oil spillage.
19
  In a 
letter to his wife in 1909, Nigerian Bitumen’s field manager Frank Drader explained the 
environmental consequence of a recent oil discovery from No. 5 Well located in Lekki Lagoon, 
which when initially tapped, flowed at a rate of 2,000 barrels a day.  Drader stated that “[t]he 
lagoon is at present all covered with oil… and there was so much oil at our wharf here that the 
Doctor got all covered last night when he went swimming, which he does every evening.”
20
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 The Nigerian Bitumen Corporation had some successful discoveries, such as well No. 12 
yielding a fair amount of good quality oil with no gas; however, by 1914 the company was 
ultimately dissolved due to compounded financial troubles and other unforeseen events.
21
  While 
other companies were present in the region, they had even less overall success than the Nigerian 
Bitumen Corporation.  This lack of success revealed much about not only the surroundings in 
which those companies were working, but also it shed light on the early conditions established 
that promoted Nigeria’s dependence on foreign companies during the late colonial period. First, 
because of the tough nature of exploration operations in the dense mangrove forests and unstable 
swamp marshes, expensive equipment and skilled personnel were required for the success and 
early sustainability of oil companies operating in Nigeria.
22
  Second, the companies that first 
started exploring for oil were small and privately owned.  Because these businesses were 
unsuccessful it could be implied that the use of large oil companies, backed with huge financial 
resources and technological capacity, was essential to conduct oil operations in the challenging 
Nigerian environment.
23
 Oil exploration in Nigeria proved to be an arena only suitable for 
companies with huge financial backing and technological capability that were based on joint 
agreements where resources could be pooled.  Early sustainability was also supported by British 
legislative acts that encouraged monopolistic control of resources. 
The Minerals Oil Ordinance of 1914, which was amended in 1925, 1950 and 1958, set 
the ground work for the British government and its main oil partners to control all aspects of oil 
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exploration in Nigeria.  The British government granted oil licenses to the British based 
companies, D’Arcy Exploration Company and the Whitehall Petroleum Corporation to explore 
within the territory.  By 1923, however, both companies surrendered their licenses because little 
or no commercial amount of oil was discovered.
24
  More than a decade later in 1936, British 
Petroleum fused interests with Royal Dutch/Shell group and became the Shell D’Arcy Oil 
Company.  This merger was one that initially took root years earlier when the two companies 
operated together in the Persian Gulf under the same joint-venture designation, Shell D’Arcy.
25
  
By 1937 a license had been issued to the joint-venture which awarded the two joined companies 
exclusive exploration rights across the whole of the Nigerian territory.
26
  Omeje states that, “the 
exclusive oil exploration authority was granted to protect the economic interests of Shell and the 
British Empire against other foreign competitors, notably American oil multinationals that were 
obviously interested in the Nigerian market.”
 27
 
Shell D’Arcy began preliminary geological and geophysical surveys in 1937 in the area 
of the Niger River Delta.  The results from the surveys determined that 103,600 square 
kilometers in southern Nigeria were oil bearing and concentrated exploration commenced.  
Operations were put on hold in 1939 as a result of the outbreak of World War II and did not 
resume again until a year after the conclusion of the War.  Furthermore, because of the War more 
import emphasis was placed on nations with already developed oil industries.  Because of a 
notice from Oil Controller, D.C. Fletcher Nigeria was forced to ration petroleum use within the 
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territory, stating that “the reduction in supplies to Nigeria will therefore involve a reduction in 
petrol resources.”   An article from 1944 states, “This [was] essentially a mechanised war in 
which on land, on the sea, and in the air fuel is of vital importance.” The article went on to claim 
that “without that fuel [result of 20% ration] the invasions would fail and Hitler would 
triumph.”
28
 Oil exploration by Shell D’Arcy resumed in Nigeria again after the conclusion of the 
War; however, the economic impact from the war was felt by the colonial power and with that 
came a tightening of control over the oil industry by the British. 
In 1948, the joint venture, Shell D’Arcy, was forced to restructure the composition of 
their internal directorate so as to satisfy the requirements of the British control clause of the 
Minerals Oil Ordinance.  A clause in the Minerals Oil Ordinance declared that non-British 
companies could not operate in the Nigerian territory.  The company’s directorate, which at the 
time of the restructuring had a majority Dutch membership, was required by the British colonial 




The Minerals Oil Ordinance continued to support the British monopoly over oil 
exploration as Shell/D’Arcy began drilling its first deep exploration well in 1951.  Unfortunately 
for the company, no oil was found in the prospectively prosperous 1951 Ihue well, which was 
located at sixteen kilometers northeast of Owerri in the present-day Imo State.  In the five years 
following, the company drilled eighteen wells of various functionalities in many different areas 
in Southeastern Nigeria.  The joint-venture discovered oil at the Akata-1 well in 1953; however, 
it was not in commercial quantities and drilling focus shifted again.  After three years of 
searching in the Oloibiri area, oil was found for the first time in commercial quantities at the well 
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two kilometers south of Otuabagi, in present day Bayelsa State, in 1956.
30
  This well measured a 
depth of approximately 12,000 feet and produced a volume of 3,000 barrels of oil per day.  
Because of the success of this well, a further eleven wells were drilled in the surrounding area.
31
  
In addition to expanding operations, success also prompted the joint-venture company Shell 
D’Arcy Exploration Company to change its name to Shell-BP Petroleum Development 
Company.   
After the successful discovery and drilling for oil in the Oloibiri wells, Shell-BP 
concentrated their efforts on developing only the most lucrative wells covering an approximate 
area of 100,000 square kilometers.  Shell-BP’s monopoly over all the oil resources ended in 
1957.  As a result, the remainder of the territory was opened up to other international oil 
corporations such as Mobil, Gulf, and Arnoseas, among many others.
32
  This internationalization 
resulted in Nigeria gaining the status of an oil-producing country.  According to Omoweh, “this 
intensified the pressure of European/American oil companies on the colonial state to gain entry 
in the Nigerian oil industry.”
33
  With the expansion of the oil industry in the Delta region, 
significant environmental damage and social distress ensued. 
 Soon following the discovery of crude oil in 1956 and with the rapidly expanding oil 
industry in Nigeria, another piece of legislation was enacted by the colonial state which would 
consequently lead to significant impact on both the natural and social environments of the Niger 
Delta.  The Oil Pipeline Act of 1956 stated that oil companies operating in Nigeria needed to 
obtain a legal permit to lay pipelines from the oil wells of the Niger Delta to their respective 
terminals where it is prepared for exportation.  Under the Act the state granted oil companies a 
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land lease agreement good for 99 years.  The lease prohibited any social and economic activity 
within 500 meters on either side of the oil company’s pipelines.  The length of time and 
stipulations significantly impacted the natural and social environments of Nigeria’s oil producing 
region for multiple reasons.  First, the length of time was so great that oil companies viewed the 
leased land as their own which therefore prompted little regulatory oversight from outside 
entities.  The Oil Pipeline Act concentrated heavily on the efficient transport of oil so little or no 
requirements was added for the protection of the environment.  This led to pipelines lying bare 
and unmaintained above ground across residential communities located along main oil producing 
transport routes.  Also, because the Act stipulated distance requirements, local inhabitants were 
essentially forced to relocate or risk breaking the law established by the colonial administration.  
The initial reason for the Oil Pipeline Act was to boost revenue for the colonial state but 
similar to other colonial legislative decrees, successive Nigerian governments left the act in place 
in the post-colonial period.  Even though the 1956 Act included language that suggested a 
concern for the environmental consequences from oil exploration and production, revenue 
accruement took precedence over the implementation of environmental safeguards.  This was 
amplified after 1960 when the independent Nigerian government lacked the appropriate 
knowledge and technical capabilities of enforcing safety regulations that would monitor pipeline 
construction and maintenance by the oil companies.  A writer for The Nigerian Citizen noted that 
the “lack of trained men is the problem.”
34
   This lack of technical skill and enforcement ability 
gave “Shell [and other companies] the leeway to lay its pipelines across sacred sites and homes 
of the people who live in the Niger Delta.”
35
  The Oil Pipeline Act of 1958 was amended in 1963 
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during the early years of political independence.  With the amendment to the Act came a 
reduction of the amount of time the land leases were awarded to the oil companies.  The initial 
lease period was reduced from 99 years to 60 years; however, the amendment to the Act did not 
lead to any significant changes. Since revenue obtained from the land lease contracts was 
immensely lucrative for key members of the political establishment in Nigeria’s post-colonial 
state, even amendments to colonial legislation did little to change already established standard 
operating procedures.  The successive post-colonial Nigerian governments working in 
collaboration with oil multinationals would essentially pick up where the colonial administration 
left off. 
From the preceding presentation a number of conclusions can be made.  The imposition 
of colonial rule and the policy of “divide and rule” in Nigeria from 1900-1960 not only created 
an uneven balance of power that favored the British colonial state, but it also ensured that 
regional diversity and ethnic differences were sustained throughout the colonial period.  The 
establishment of the colonial administration facilitated the creation of an economic system that 
allowed British companies, and then European and American companies, to dominate Nigeria’s 
burgeoning oil industry.  For example the Minerals Oil Ordinance encouraged oil exploration 
and production by large oil joint-ventures.  These large oil joint-ventures had a monopoly of the 
technology and the technical expertise to completely dominate every facet of the oil industry 
during the colonial period.  The colonial state did not put in place regulatory policies.  As a result 
the multinational oil corporations operated in a regulatory vacuum which has resulted in 
unbridled environmental destruction.  The relationship between the colonial state and the 
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multinational companies would foreshadow the economic, political, and legal structures of 
Nigeria’s post -colonial governments. 
33 
 
CHAPTER 2: NIGERIA’S POST-COLONIAL POLITICS AND THE 
EXPANSION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY, 1960-1988 
 
Chapter two analyzes the environmental degradation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta from 
political independence in 1960 to 1988 when Nigeria established the first governmental agency 
with the specific goal of environmental protection.  During this timeframe, Nigerian politics 
went through incredible changes, first from 1965 to 1979, and then again from 1979 to 1986.  
This chapter argues that the Nigerian government put into place policies that facilitated oil 
exploration, drilling, and production, at the expense of regulatory policies.  Furthermore, the 
Nigerian government sought to control a larger share of the revenues from the production of oil.  
In other words, the successive governments were more interested in oil revenues than they were 
in establishing safeguards against the impacts of oil operations.  Moreover, Nigeria’s political 
landscape was beleaguered by ethnic politics, the lack of political will to institute regulatory 
reform in the oil industry, and the intrusion of the military into Nigerian political life.  
Additionally, decades of British colonialism had rendered the manufacturing and extractive 
industries reliant on European technology and knowledge.   At the time of independence, 
Nigeria’s economy was still heavily dependent on agricultural exports; however, by the early 
1970s oil had replaced agricultural exports as Nigeria’s chief foreign exchange earner.   
Important changes in Nigerian politics began to take place during the mid-1960s when oil 
production increased and quickly raised Nigeria to become the wealthiest nation in Africa.  With 
the appeal of quick money, successive governments in Nigeria promoted the speedy expansion of 
the oil industry in a regulatory void.  Besides, the Nigerian government lacked the monitoring 
mechanisms to effectively oversee the oil industry with concerns relating to environmental 
34 
 
protection.  In short, in the aftermath of political independence, the multinational oil corporations 
operating in Nigeria’s Niger Delta were essentially left to police themselves.  
Nigeria achieved political independence on October 1, 1960; however, with 
independence many challenges faced the new government.  Foremost among the challenges 
facing the new nation was the British colonial legacy.  Decades of British colonialism in Nigeria 
left an economic structure in place that was geared to favor the growth of foreign multinationals 
as well as Britain itself; in addition the colonial policy of “divide and rule,” engendered a 
political system that was profoundly broken.  According to Frederick Cooper, Africa’s post-
colonial states were “gate-keeper” states.  Rather than focusing on the dichotomy between the 
colonial and post-colonial state, Cooper bridges the gap between the two by highlighting the 
continuities within both periods.  For Cooper, the post-colonial state was a logical extension of 
the colonial state because the structures and institutions that African leaders inherited were 
maintained and sustained after independence was achieved.  The example of Nigeria’s oil 
industry confirms Cooper’s thesis.  To be sure, Nigeria’s post-colonial state was weak, and 
although rich in raw materials it lacked the technological capacity to exploit those resources on 
its own terms.  Moreover, Nigeria’s economy at the time of political independence was still 
export oriented.   
While the successive Nigerian governments implemented policies such as indigenization 
and import substitution as a way to obtain greater control over the exploitation of its resources, 
those schemes only marginally affected the control of the oil industry by multinational 
corporations.  This has been compounded by the emergence of what Fredrick Cooper calls 
“clientelism,” in other words, the diversion of state resources to political ends.
1
  The Nigerian 
state collaborated with the oil joint-ventures which intensified not only official corruption, but 
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also the negative effects of “clientelism” for the Nigerian people.  This chapter describes briefly 
Nigeria’s political system from independence to 1979 in order to identify the fault lines in the 
system.  Additionally, this chapter demonstrates that although Nigeria’s political changes from 
1965-1979 did not adversely affect Nigeria’s oil production, with exception of the Civil War 
period of 1967-1970; it did create the conditions for the mismanagement of Nigeria’s oil wealth.  
 
Road to Political Independence 
The time period from 1947 to 1960 marked a time of great change for Nigeria’s colonial 
system.  Upon the conclusion of World War II, young educated Nigerians formed numerous 
groups and organizations aimed at achieving their ultimate goal of self-government.  The various 
youth organizations coalesced to form the Nigerian National Council, which soon incorporated 
members from the Cameroonian associations in Lagos, and the movement was renamed the 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC).  In addition to the main objective of 
self-governance, the NCNC also promoted the unification of the Nigerian people across ethnic 
lines.  In less than a year after the formation of the NCNC, Governor Richards of the British 
colonial administration presented a series of proposed amendments to Nigeria’s former 1923 
Constitution.  The new Richards Constitution, as it was referred to, was viewed as significantly 
flawed by many Nigerians because it did little to implement the much anticipated post-war 
reforms.
2
 The NCNC took the lead role in protesting this new Constitution by exercising various 
forms of resistance available to them.  In addition to rumors of assassination plots and the 
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banning of several key Nigerian newspapers, the NCNC toured the colonial territory and raised 
money to send a delegation to England to protest against the 1946 Constitution.
3
   
When the delegation left for London in June 1947, Nigerians were in a heightened state 
of discontent.  Some members of the NCNC became increasingly militant. They organized 
public lectures, formed protest rallies, and incited resistance movements by workers against the 
British colonial regime.  Resistance to the Constitution prompted a cycle of events where the 
British colonial police responded to protests violently which further led to more protests and 
rallies.  In 1948, as a way to appeal to the unrest and frustration of the Nigerian people the 
British colonial administration significantly revised the Richards Constitution.  The revised 
Richards Constitution reinforced the initial objective of the NCNC by promoting pan-Nigerian 
unity through resistance; however, it also exacerbated regional loyalties by creating separate and 
individual assembly houses in each of the three existing Nigerian regions.  Regional separation 
was met with mixed feelings by the Nigerian people.  The newly reformed political system made 
it apparent to the population that a single unitary governmental structure was unlikely to 
maintain stability in Nigeria’s three diverse geographical, economic, and cultural regions for 
long.     
As a response to the grievances presented by the Nigerian people about the weaknesses in 
the Richards Constitution, the new colonial governor John Macpherson held a Constitutional 
Conference in Ibadan in 1950 which included the participation of Nigerian nationalist leaders.  In 
1951 the Macpherson Constitution was passed, significantly altering the previous political 
framework.  The Macpherson Constitution was an improvement of the Richards Constitution in 
many ways such as granting greater legislative and economic power to the regional assemblies as 
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well as generating the first general elections; however, with the advent of those changes, regional 
lines grew more polarized.  Ethnic loyalties galvanized during the general election where a 
Yoruba-dominated Western Region, an Igbo-dominated Eastern region, and a Hausa/Fulani-
dominated Northern Region separated accordingly into political parties and campaigned for 
control over the various regional assemblies.
4
     
Political parties in the Eastern and Western Regions pushed the political agenda of 
internal self-governance while the Northern Region opposed the scheme claiming the Nigerian 
territory was not ready for it.  At the center of the debate was the issue of governmental 
centralization.  Two constitutional conferences were held between July 1953 and February 1954 
which included representatives from all regions to settle deliberations over this central issue.  As 
a result the Lyttleton Constitution was enacted in 1954.  The Lyttleton Constitution established 
Nigeria as a federation, consisting of the existing three regional distinctions, and the central 
administration was created in the newly formed Federal Territory of Lagos.  With the new 
Constitution, each region was afforded the option of becoming fully self-governed; however, no 
region immediately did so, and the British colonial administration remained in control.      
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Figure 4: Regional Divisions5 
 
The Lyttleton Constitution appealed to both the supporters of a strong central government 
and those in favor of regional autonomy.  By 1957, the regions of the West and East opted for 
self-government and the Northern region claimed self-governance in 1959.  Regional self-
government cemented ethnic dominance in each region, Hausa/Fulani in the North, Yoruba in 
the West, and Igbo in the East; consequently, the ethnic minority groups feared a lack of 
representation in their respective regions.  This led to further debates, and further ethnic 
divergence.  In addition to minority concerns, the fear of southern domination by Northern 
politicians proliferated across much of the Eastern and Western portions of the territory.  In an 
effort to calm fears, provisions were established within the new political framework which 
barred Northern radical groups from taking over governmental power.  Nigerian leaders and the 
British set October 1, 1960 as the date for Nigerian independence.  Upon political independence 
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the newly sovereign nation was still deeply fractured along regional and ethnic lines.  This would 




Figure 5: Nigeria's Main Ethnic Groups7 
 
The First Republic           
Both the 1960 and the 1963 constitutions of the newly independent Nigeria were framed 
by the British parliamentary system.  Under the new governing structure, Nigeria’s First 
Republic attempted national programs to promote social and economic development.  Among the 
key issues on the agenda were more governmental control over national resources, better and 
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more efficient infrastructure to aid Nigeria’s production economy, and a rapid revamping of 
educational and health services. While the goals set by the new government were ambitious, and 
some success was noted, the shortcomings far outweighed the achievements.  Issues of colonial 
legacy, national unity, and economic underdevelopment all plagued the national agenda of the 
First Republic.  Paramount in affecting these issues was the burgeoning development of 
Nigeria’s oil industry and the significance of that industry in the global economic system.  
During the first half of the 1960s Nigeria experienced a liberalization of oil investments that 
essentially opened Nigeria up to a more diverse collection of foreign investors.  Oil production 
during the span of time from 1958-1966 grew from 5,100 barrels per day to over 417,000 barrels 
per day respectively.
8
   
As a result of Nigeria’s post-colonial reliance on the technology owned by oil companies, 
the state developed a system of revenue collection which concentrated on the collection of land 
rents from oil companies operating in the area. Because Nigeria had vast oil reserves and 
virtually no pollution regulations guiding the oil industry, especially when held in comparison to 
the oil regulations of developed nations, foreign oil companies were attracted to the region.  Prior 
to the start of any oil operation in developed nations throughout the world, a careful and 
thorough environmental impact study was required to assess the potential negative effects oil 
operations will have on the surrounding ecological area.
9
  The lack of environmental safeguards 
enticed multinationals to Nigeria’s oil-producing area.  This produced larger revenues for the 
Nigerian government and large oil companies.  Besides, there companies avoided any 
responsibility for putting in place regulatory measures. Additionally, because revenue was 
collected from land rents, this system provided little impetus for the Nigerian government to 
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concentrate on the development of a nationalized oil industry in the immediate aftermath of 
independence.  
The First Republic recorded some achievements during the early years of political 
independence.  First, independence afforded everyday Nigerians the opportunity to actively 
participate in governmental decisions for the first time.  Under the First Republic, there was a 
revival of African cultural arts, more access to public information through radio, newspapers, 
and book publishing, and an expansion of educational institutions.  However, these marginal 
accomplishments by the First Republic were far outweighed by its failure to transform Nigeria’s 
economy from its dependence on export revenue.  During the governing of the First Republic 
there were widespread unemployment, declining food production, and signs of popular uprising 
throughout the nation.  In addition, the problems of national identity were never fully settled 
prior to attaining independence.  Political power struggles between regional groups were 
intensified as the economic importance of Nigeria’s developing oil industry on the global market 
increased and as the different regions vied for control of a greater share of oil revenues.  Political 
parties were formed along ethnic lines which prevented the rise of a general sense of Nigerian 
nationalism. Nigerian political culture would be characterized by political patronage at the 
regional level at the expense of national unity.  Consequently, a system of, what Frederick 




The most severe cases of corruption at the time were occurring in the Western region of 
Nigeria because of the large revenue increases as a result of the prospering cocoa industry.  A 
small group of political leaders were using their elite status to extract large sums of money from 
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cocoa revenue to benefit their personal financial situations.
11
  Corruption took root regionally 
and eventually spread upwards to the federal level.
12
  Throughout the period of the First 
Republic, Ayittey states that, “government contracts, purchases, and loan programs were 
systematically manipulated to enrich political officials and the politically well connected.”
13
 
With rumors of corruption proliferating across the nation, the collective population began to 
question whether the newly established federal system was adequate.
14
   These years were 
intended to be a time of great wealth and advancement for Nigeria, a “period when the objectives 
of political independence were supposed to be idealized and set into motion by the Nigerian 
leadership.”
15
  Instead, the years following independence were marked by political instability and 
stagnation that resulted in “a three-year crisis which drained the political, military, economic and 
human resources of the young nation.”
16
   
 
The Nigerian Civil War 
Newly obtained Nigerian independence was delicate, and soon after the nation united, 
ethnic lines again began to polarize.  While political corruption and ethnic rivalry produced by 
the colonial legacy engendered the conditions for the eventual overthrow of the civilian-run First 
Republic, the immediate causes of the war were the result of certain key incidences that began 
with the contested results of the census of 1962 and ended in civil war.  When the census was 
conducted in 1962, Nigeria had three prominent political parties: the National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the North, and 
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the Action Group (AG) in the West.  The NCNC and the AG both hoped that the results from the 
1962 census would alter the representational ratio of the regions in their favor.  The figures were 
thought to have been tampered with because the numbers revealed that each regions’ population 
had grown by nearly 75%.  The results were dismissed and a new census was conducted the 
following year in 1963.  The new census was once again questioned by the people; however, 
instead of the controversy focusing on false numbers it centered on the attempt of one region 
dominating another.  Although contended, the results of the second census became official which 
meant a favorable proportional allocation of governmental representation and revenue for the 
Northern Region.  The corrupted census revealed to Nigerians the extent to which each regional 
government would go to obtain political power.       
Accusations of corruption and shady politics were reinforced by the federal elections of 
1964.  These tainted elections, the first held in the post-independence period, spawned violence 
and bitterness among the Nigerian population.  These elections were marred by the harassment 
of electoral officials, the blatant tampering of election results, and the prevention of the Eastern 
region from participating in the election.  The post-election period was marked by controversy 
and conflict between regions.  Among all else, the 1964 elections demonstrated to the population 
the fragile nature of the Republic.   
By 1965, it was apparent that Nigerian political leaders were more interested in personal 
gains than addressing weaknesses in the political system.  On January 15, 1966, there was a 
military coup that set in motion a series of events which began with an overthrow of the civilian 
run First Republic and culminated with the splitting of the nation and the eruption of civil war.  
The initial reason for the January 15
th
 coup, claimed by the leaders, was to bring an end to the 
tribalism and corruption that became associated with the First Republic’s political establishment.  
44 
 
In an attempt to remedy the mistakes of the former government, the commanding officer of the 
Nigerian army, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, an ethnic Igbo, abolished the federal system and 
adopted a unitary one.  With this, the regional divisions of power were now replaced by a 
centralized administration that controlled the military and civil services of each separate 
province.  The Northern region viewed this move as a way for the Igbo ethnicity to exert 
domination over the whole of the nation.  In response, on July 29, 1966 a group of northerners 
staged a countercoup which resulted in the capture and death of Ironsi and Lieutenant Colonel 
Gowon took over power.  Over the time since the initial coup, there was continuous violence in 
both the North and Eastern regions targeting specific ethnic groups.  The Igbos of the East began 
questioning if they could ever live in harmony with the rest of Nigeria.  As a result, on May 30, 
the military governor of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu declared independence 
for the East and the new Independent Republic of Biafra was established accordingly. 
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War left between one and three million Nigerians 
dead.  Not only did the War leave a significant political legacy by maintaining a military run 
government in the aftermath, but it also had tremendous consequences for Nigeria’s oil industry, 
natural environment, and social communities.  In an article from the Nigerian Tide, the federal 
military government was urged to recognize how pollution from oil operations was impacting 
fishing communities in the wake of the civil war.  The Commissioner for Agriculture, Chief 
Dappa-Biriye observed “that mineral oil disasters in oil bearing states during and after the recent 
civil war have led to considerable spillage of oil into surrounding waters, adding that this had 
exterminated marine life which fishermen live.”
17
  Although pollution was an apparent problem 
affecting the living conditions of the residents of oil-bearing regions, the Nigerian government 
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continued to implement policies which upheld the colonial traditions of resource control while 
they neglected regulatory guidelines. 
An example of a policy that supported the agenda of the newly formed political 
establishment was the Petroleum Act which essentially repealed the former colonial Minerals Oil 
Ordinance.  However, while the Petroleum Act of 1969 created a new framework for oil 
operations, this piece of legislation, in fact did not significantly break away from the colonial 
inspired system. Similar to the colonial Minerals Oil Ordinance, the Petroleum Act was vague, as 
well as neglectful toward regulating the oil industry.  The Petroleum Act borrowed from the 
previously common legislative notion of ‘good oil field practice’ as a way to ensure oil 
companies were engaging in environmentally sound activities.
18
  Not only was this concept not 
adequately defined, but it also remained unclear with regard to issues of liability for damage to 
the environment.  Because of this, many legal cases were brought to Nigerian courts against oil 
companies by village communities demanding compensation for damages to property and their 
environment.  During exploration activity by Agip Oil Company, the people of the village of 
Biokponga saw significant damage to their land, crops, economic trees, and fish ponds.  As a 
result, the village filed legal action against the responsible party, Agip Oil, for compensation 
which amounted to N100,000.
19
  When the case was brought to court, almost two years after the 
initial incidents occurred, the final decision on compensation amount was further postponed 
because of a lack of sufficient evidence on the side of the plaintiffs.  Similar cases of legal 
neglect increased in number as oil operations became more widespread throughout the Niger 
Delta Region, and little was done by the Nigerian government to amend outstanding legislation. 
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The Petroleum Act also stated that all lessees shall “adopt all practicable precautions, 
including the provision of up-to-date equipment to prevent pollution and, in the event that 
pollution occurs, to take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end it.”
20
Adherence to this 
regulation required environmental safety measure to be in place such as blow-out preventers and 
protection of pipelines and tanks.  Being that the greatest sum of oil spillage occurred as a result 
of equipment failure, at the time when the Act was enacted and to the present day, it was obvious 
that the military government, as well as the successive governments, lacked the monitoring 
capabilities to enforce the environmental stipulations supported by this particular law.
21
  The 
military government was more concerned with oil production and financial gain and less about 
environmental protection.  The Petroleum Act established a precedent for oil operations in the 
post-colonial Nigerian state, yet similar to regulations enacted during British rule it failed to 
contain clear and coherent environmental safeguards against oil pollution. 
Not only was pollution from oil spillage becoming a serious problem for the people of oil 
rich areas, but also, other environmental impacts were causing distress to the population’s 
livelihoods.  Unchecked oil operations, both onshore and offshore, sent a fear of extinction 
throughout the population of a particular Niger Delta community because of operational 
invasiveness and forced migration.  An article in the Nigerian Observer detailed that as a result 
of offshore and onshore oil operations in the Delta Region, the coast was being continually 
exposed to the encroaching sea.  Because of this vulnerability the community of Ugoborado had 
lost “eight kilometers of homeland to the sea” as well as more “to oil companies by way of wells, 
canals, ditches and [had] now found itself driven back to swamp land infested by disease 
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  The article further explained that the community “recalled that several 
appeals had been made to previous and present governments and feared that further delay may 
cause the people more hardship.”
23
In this particular case, the people of the disappearing 
community were not seeking a specific amount of monetary compensation, rather they were 
pleading to the federal military government and the oil companies operating in the area to assist 
in rehabilitating the area or to aid in finding more suitable places for them to live.  The federal 
government was aware of the problems facing the coastal communities, such as the one 
exemplified in the article, but no action was taken at the time; besides, no companies were held 
responsible.  In another instance, the people of Ukwa sought assistance from the oil multinational 
Shell-BP which had been operating in their homeland for decades.  An article in The Nigerian 
Observer stated that “Ukwa produces oil but the people had not benefited from the oil produced 
in their area.”  Dr. Njoku, a spokesman for the Ukwa people claimed, “we have in the past 22 
years made passionate appeals and requests to the company to assist us in our development 
programmes but the management shunned us.”
24
  Environmental issues continued to be a major 
concern for the people of the oil-bearing regions of the Niger Delta, yet legislation continued to 
lack clear and concrete stipulations for environmental protection. 
Several laws passed in the 1960s and 1970s presented important environmental related 
regulations; however, these regulations were vague, overgeneralized, and due to the lack of 
enforcement capabilities, were rendered essentially ineffective. In addition there was also 
legislation that was passed during the late 1960s that ostensibly portrayed awareness for the 
negative environmental consequences from oil operations; but contained inherent loopholes and 
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contradictions which trumped environmental protection by favoring oil producers.  An example 
of this can be seen with the Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968.  The Act, as it read, 
“permit[ed] the discharge of hazardous substances or petroleum under certain circumstances, 
such as if the escape of oil from a vessel was due to leakage and the leakage was not due to any 
want of reasonable care and all reasonable steps were taken to stop or reduce the discharge.”
25
 
Oil spillage was an inevitable part of conducting oil operations; however, with laws such as the 
Petroleum Act and the Oil in Navigable Waters Act guiding the industry, oil spills occurred 
regularly throughout the 1960s with little legally enforced consequences for the responsible 
party. 
 
The 1970s: OPEC and the Oil Boom 
The early 1970s proved to be a time of change for Nigeria’s oil industry.  In 1971 Nigeria 
joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a way to safeguard 
interests in the international market at a time when the Nigerian oil production was escalating.  
Membership for Nigeria was an advantage because “OPEC regulat[ed] annual oil production, 
and by doing so influenc[ed] international oil prices through such mechanisms as production 
quotas and ceilings that all members [were] obliged to obey.”
26
  OPEC encouraged 
indigenization which was also strongly supported by the other oil producing member countries.
27
  
Entrance into OPEC opened the opportunity for Nigerians to hold high skilled positions in the oil 
companies; however, because of the educational institutions created by the colonial British 
administration that reality would prove complicated.  The educational institutions created by the 
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British during the colonial era focused more on the arts and culture and neglected the sciences 
and applied research.  An article from the Nigerian Standard stated, “a definite policy should be 
adopted which motivates people in the pure sciences so that a science oriented society that makes 
use of available local materials is developed.”
28
  The article further stated that “in order to 
encourage technological inventiveness in Nigeria, there is the need to have a strong science base 
in our educational awareness.”
29
Aside from the problems presented, entrance into OPEC gave 
greater power to Nigeria as an oil producing nation on the global oil market and with that came 
significant changes to the industry. 
There were certain requirements that came along with OPEC membership which 
coincided with Nigeria’s attempts toward indigenization.  Most importantly OPEC required, as 
stipulated in Resolution No. XVI.90, “all member countries to acquire 51 percent of foreign 
equity interests and to participate more actively in all aspects of all operations.”
30
  To prepare the 
country for ingress into OPEC Nigeria’s federal government formed the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNOC).  This state-owned corporation acted as a mechanism through which the 
Nigerian government could actively participate in all aspects of oil production.  Additionally, it 
set certain provisions concerning profit sharing and royalty collection.  The Foreign Enterprises 
Decree of 1972 detailed that the Nigerian Government obtain 35 percent of the joint-venture, 
Shell-BP.  Two years later the NNOC was chosen to represent the federal government in the 
Shell-BP joint-venture, and by 1974 the NNOC was controlling 55 percent of the equity from 
petroleum production in Nigeria.
31
  As a result, Shell-BP would be renamed Shell Petroleum 
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Development Company of Nigeria; a name by which the company still distinguishes itself 
presently. 
In 1977, the NNOC was dissolved and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) was formed.  The NNPC acted in the same capacity as the previous NNOC, in that the 
company supervised oil extraction as well as provided direction for oil companies operating in 
Nigeria.  To ensure more control of the country’s oil industry Nigeria underwent a national 
program of indigenization.  Through the indigenization of vital parts of the oil operations, the 
establishment of greater governmental control over oil operations, and the allowance of oil 
companies to engage in oil exploration at their own risk, the Nigerian government began to 
slowly restructure the dynamic of control over the country’s oil resources.
32
  Exemplified in the 
amended Nigerian Federal Constitution, the structure of resource control was outlined within 
chapter 350 section 1(1).  The constitution specified, “[t]he entire ownership and control of all 
petroleum in, under, or upon any lands to which this section applies shall be vested in the 
state.”
33
  The next line provided a more narrowed definition which declares that the application 
refers to all land, including land covered by water, which is in Nigeria, is under the territorial 
waters of Nigeria, forms part of the continental shelf, or forms part of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) of Nigeria.  In spite of Nigeria’s control of the oil industry, it was more concerned 
with oil production than in creating regulatory policies. 
During General Gowon tenure of the mid-1970s, millions of naira generated from oil 
revenue disappeared from the government.  Officials on the federal and state levels both stole 
large sums of money from the government through varying methods.  Some officials would 
simply alter accounting numbers while others would award governmental contracts to friends 
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and in turn receive massive monetary kickback from those contracts.  The official corruption of 
Nigeria’s oil boom years extended to nearly all facets of governmental programs.  Indigenization 
was not only focused on the oil industry, during the 1970s many different Nigerian businesses 
were indigenizing.  The ultimate goal was to take control of economic activity from foreign 
investors and place it in the hands of Nigerians.  While this scheme increased the number of 
businesses owned by Nigerians, it did little to improve the poor living conditions of the average 
person.  Since the already prosperous, with interests aligned with foreign investors and rent-
seeking politicians, were the ones primarily investing in Nigerian businesses, the indigenization 
process did more to promote governmental corruption and class separation, than to enrich the 
livelihoods of the everyday Nigerian.  After Gowon’s military government was ousted by a coup 
in 1975, a governmental inquiry was launched to examine official corruption during the rule of 
the military government.  The results of the commission exposed 10 state governors to be guilty 
of misusing government funds in excess of 16 million naira.
34
         
Along with an effort to indigenize, the Nigerian government also adopted an economic 
policy of import substitution which intended to revamp not only the oil industry but also the 
agricultural, steel, and iron industries to name a few.  Advocates of import substitution posited 
replacing foreign imports with domestic production.  The policy failed in Nigeria for a number of 
reasons.  First, the technical foundation, such as a skilled labor force and infrastructure to support 
the massive revamping of domestic industrialization was simply not present in Nigeria.  Second, 
while there was a significant increase in the physical transfer of technology through the import of 
large-scale machinery and equipment, Nigeria lacked the technical expertise to operate the 
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machinery.  Lastly, because of a lack of standardization measures, when equipment failed the 
Nigerian government imported more instead of fixing the equipment locally.
35
   
  Throughout the indigenization of the oil industry, environmental issues remained a 
concern of the population of the oil regions; however, little was done by the government to 
enforce any regulation managing pollution.  Additionally, with oil production at a record level at 
the end of the 1970s there was much social contention created over how oil revenues would be 
dispersed across the nation.  The head of Shell-BP released an article in the Nigerian Observer 
that approximately 2.4 million barrels of oil was being produced per day and that his company 
had found more oil than has been produced.
36
  During the 1970s Nigeria experienced a booming 
economy because of the rising price of oil on the global market as well as a massive increase in 
crude oil production and export levels.   Not coincidently, the oil-rich states of the Niger Delta 
wished for it to be distributed based on the quantity of oil derived from each state, whereas the 
non-producing regions opposed that, and wanted it to be based on population.
37
  However, apart 
from the revenue debate, one thing remained certain: environmental concerns took an ancillary 
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Year Production Export Domestic Consumption 
1970 395,689 383,455 12,234 
1971 558,689 542,545 16,144 
1972 665,295 650,640 14,655 
1973 719,379 695,627 23,752 
1974 823,320 795,710 27,610 
1975 660,148 627,638 32,510 
1976 758,058 736,822 21,236 
1977 766,055 715,240 50,815 
1978 696,324 674,125 22,199 
1979 845,463 807,685 37,778 
1980 760,117 656,260 103,857 
Figure 6: Crude Oil Production and Export (Barrels) 38 
 
An op-ed article in the Nigerian Chronicle, warned the Nigerian government to “avoid 
the mistakes of some developed countries who embark on economic development without regard 
to the effect of pollution.”
39
  It further stated that Nigeria was not only developing, but it was 
also in a great hurry to develop.  Because of this, the nation needed to pay careful attention to 
certain environmental impacts associated with development such as water pollution, soil erosion, 
destruction of forests, and the effects of oil exploration.  The setting up of a permanent body to 
study and make recommendations on how pollution could be checked effectively was proposed 
by the article; however, no environmental enforcement entity was established.  Although the 
Nigerian government was now taking a more active role in the oil industry the laws created to 
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regulate it were deliberately in favor of the oil companies, especially with situations where oil 
pollution charges were brought against them from the social community. 
Multinational oil companies were gradually controlling major governmental decisions 
with regard to the oil industry, and as a result the people of the oil-producing regions were 
desperate for significant change to the existing policies.  In an opinion piece for the Nigerian 
Tide, A.B.D. Nedom of the University of Ibadan, wrote on the need for a national pollution 
commission to regulate the unfair practices outlined in certain pieces of Nigerian legislation.  
Nedom stated that large oil companies, “companies bearing either Dutch or combination of 
Anglo-Dutch or French-Dutch names”, almost always secured exclusive oil exploration rights, 
while the “indigenous contracting companies [were] never within such contracts.”
40
  He further 
explained that the meager, if any, monetary compensation rewarded to the indigenous population 
in the event that their land or economic property was destroyed, was leading to social conflicts 
with pollutions.  Because the majority of the people of oil-exploited areas were either farmers or 
fishermen the consequences from oil pollution essentially left them with no form of livelihood, 
yet taxes were still required to be paid to the government.   Nedom highlighted how decisions 
over exploitation were made outside the country by large companies which resulted in little or no 
say by the people over how resources and revenues should be collected and distributed.  “The 
crumbs of the operations which our indigenous contractors have [were] the supply of cheap-
cheap labour or transporting chemicals and building huts at the site of operations.”
41
  These 
social problems associated with pollution were intensified with the changing political climate as 
well as certain legislative acts passed during the latter part of the 1970s 
                                                 
40
 A.B.D. Nedom, “Why a National Pollution Commission?,” Nigerian Tide, December 11, 1971. 
41
 Nedom, “Why a National Pollution Commission?” 
55 
 
In 1979, the current military government, headed by General Obasanjo, willingly handed 
over political power to the civilian administration of the Second Republic under President 
Shagari.  The Second Republic inherited an economy in decline.  The financial windfalls 
experienced from the oil boom in the earlier years of the decade were followed by economic 
decline from the oil bust of the late 1970s.  Corruption was still rampant in the political system; 
however, with Nigeria now a debtor state, the lavish lifestyles of politicians became more 
pronounced within the context of a poor economic climate.  According to Ayittey, “wealth 
exported by top government officials was unofficially estimated by Western diplomats at $5 
billion to $7 billion during the short-lived second republic, the most corrupt in Nigeria’s 
history.”
42
   
The constitution adopted by the Second Republic fostered corruption.  Modeled by the 
US Constitution, the so called presidential constitution of the Second Republic lent power to the 
executive branch to fill high ranking offices with individuals of the president’s choosing.  The 
spoils system of politics undermined the national reform agenda by filling potentially lucrative 
government jobs with friends and followers of the president.   In Democracy and Prebendal 
Politics in Nigeria, Richard Joseph aptly utilizes Max Weber’s definition of prebendalism, as 
applied to feudal societies where public office was attained by an individual in return for loyal 
service to the authority, to describe Nigeria’s political organization during the Second Republic.   
Joseph contends that the official roles and responsibilities of political office in Nigeria took a 
subsidiary role to the “justifying principle that offices should be competed for and utilized for the 
personal benefit of the office-holders as well as of their reference or support group.”
43
 He further 
concludes that Nigerian prebendal politics, along with “clentelism,” destabilized the democratic 
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institutions of Nigeria rendering the survival of a workable democratic system essentially 
impossible.            
Additionally, the new legislation of the late 1970s was more concerned with reversing 
economic decline than it was in addressing disastrous environmental concerns.  The Land Use 
Decree of 1978, later renamed the Land Use Act of 1979, neutralized all traditional impediments 
to land acquisition under traditional law which freed up land for oil activity.  The Act stated that 
all land where oil was explored, produced, or transported, was owned solely by the state.  Oil 
companies essentially paid a rent directly to the state for the authorization to conduct oil 
operations on that land.  In the likely case that environmental damage occurred, under the 
regulatory guidelines of the Land Use Act it was only the state that was legally permitted to 
protest, not the former inhabitant occupying the land.
44
  While this Act placed considerable 
control with the Nigerian Government, the most controversial aspect of the new law was the 
government’s authority to revoke any inhabitant’s right to occupancy for reasons of overriding 
public interest.  The Land Use Act incited land-centered conflicts among the people of the Niger 
Delta which led to further fragmentation of an already fragile social dynamic.
45
  With the Act in 
place, the people of the Niger Delta, who lived where the bulk of oil exploration and operations 
were conducted, were essentially turned from legal inhabitants to unlawful intruders on their own 
lands.  According to legal scholar Jedrzej Frynas “[t]o sum it up, the Land Use Act allowed oil 
companies to gain easier access to the land and to the oil resources through the government.”
46
 
The provisions written into the Land Use Act rendered the population of the Niger Delta 
essentially unrepresented in the event that pollution was caused to their environment.  Upon the 
occasion that protest did arise, the government was quick, as well as right within the law to 
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deploy its military to silence the opposition.  This left little remediating action possible for the 
people most impacted by the environmental destruction of their land.  While the Act was 
composed to vest ownership of land to the state to be “held in trust and administered for the use 
and benefit of all Nigerians” the implications diverged greatly from the supposed goal.
47
  The 
Land Use Act undoubtedly favored oil company interests over that of the people of Niger Delta.  
This in turn induced more reckless oil operations as seen through increased incidents of oil 
spillage as well as greater amounts of gas flaring sites.  This led to further environmental 
degradation with little or no liability costs from the responsible oil companies.  
 
Harmful Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Operations 
Since the beginning of oil production in the mid-twentieth century there have been 
numerous oil spills in Nigeria’s coastal zones that have negatively impacted the natural and 
social environments of the Niger River Delta.  In 1978, a tank failed at Shell Petroleum 
Development Company’s Forcados Terminal resulting in nearly 600,000 barrels of oil being 
released into the coastal zone.  Also in 1978, there was an incident of oil spillage from a pipeline 
leading to the terminal at Bonny.  The Bonny terminal oil spill was estimated to have released 
close to 500 million barrels of oil along a 25 kilometer stretch of pipeline.  It was reported that 
oil on the water surface was 2.5 centimeters thick.  Two years later in 1980, Texaco’s Funiwa-5 
well experienced a blowout resulting in approximately 400,000 barrels of oil to be discharged.
48
 
On average, according to statistics produced from SPDC, there were over 220 incidents of oil 
spillage per year.  During the fifteen year period from 1976 to 1991 there were a reported 2,976 
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Soil and ground water were continually being contaminated from oil spills 
across the oil producing region of the Niger River Delta; however, oil spillage was not the only 
way in which oil operations were impacting the natural and social environments of the Niger 
River communities. 
Year Number of 
Spills 






Quantity Lost to 
Environment 
1976 128 26,157.00 7,135.05 19,021.50 72.72 
1978 154 489,294.75 39,1445.00 97,849.75 20.00 
1980 241 600,511.02 42,416.83 558,094.19 92.94 
1982 257 42,841.00 2,171.40 40,669.60 94.03 
1984 151 40,209.00 1,644.80 38,564.20 95.91 
1986 155 12,905.00 552.00 12,353.00 95.72 
1988 208 9,172.00 1,955.00 7,217.00 78.69 
Figure 7: Oil Spills in the Petroleum Industry (1976-1988) in Barrels50 
Compounding the damage that was being caused by oil spillage, there was also the 
harmful practice of gas flaring.  Gas flaring, the process by which natural gas was burned out of 
the crude oil in its basic state during extraction, began at the start of commercialized oil 
production in the 1960s.  Because of an inadequate infrastructure in place to effectively store and 
utilize the extracted natural gas, approximately 75 percent of it was flared.   On a global scale, 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta flared about 20 percent of the collective world total and as a result 
approximately 11 million metric tons of methane was released into the atmosphere.
51
  While the 
release of methane was harmful it was not the only product released into the air, there was also 
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hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide which all contributed to a worsening of air 
quality for the social communities living in oil-producing areas.  
Year Outputs Utilization Quantity Flared Percentage Flared 
1970 8,039 72 7,957 99 
1971 12,975 185 12,790 99 
1972 17,122 274 16,848 98 
1973 21,882 295 21,487 98 
1974 27,882 323 26,776 99 
1975 18,656 659 15,333 98 
1976 21,279 972 20,617 97 
1977 21,924 1,866 20,952 96 
1978 2,306 1,546 19,440 91 
1979 27,619 2,951 26,073 94 
1980 24,551 3,442 22,904 93 
1981 17,113 3,244 14,817 83 
1982 15,382 3,438 11,940 78 
1983 15,192 3,723 11,946 79 
1984 16,255 4,822 13,917 79 
1985 18,569 4,794 12,291 80 
1986 17,085 5,516 14,737 74 
1987 20,253 6,323 18,730 72 
1988 25,053 6,343 21,820 73 
Figure 8: Gas Production and Utilization in Nigeria (Million Cubic Meters)52 
The negative impacts to the environment from gas flaring included, but were not limited 
to, air pollution, acid rain, and soil and crop contamination. The harmful gases that were released 
into the air as byproducts of gas flaring were absorbed and returned to the earth as soot through 
rainfall.  This polluted rain covered houses, crops and other various plants with thick deposits of 
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black soot.  This soot as well as acid rain also, found its way into local streams and rivers which 
further added to water contamination.  Gas flaring not only contaminated the natural 
environment but also interfered with the social community’s ability to maintain healthy living 
conditions.  Harmful human effects ranged from respiratory illness, such as asthma and 
bronchitis, to hearing and skin problems.  In addition, an elevated rate of birth complications had 
been associated with gas flaring.
53
  Some flare sites which were situated near villages and close 
to homes had been continually flaring gas on a twenty-four hour basis throughout the 
introduction of mass oil production in the Niger Delta.
54
 
Because of the nature of gas flaring operations it was difficult to quantitatively evaluate 
its environmental impacts; however, communities have been distressed by the practice since its 
commencement.  In 1972, a legal case was brought against Shell-BP by the Rumuokani 
community over the harmful effects of gas flaring, targeting the heat, noise, and vibration 
emanating from the flare site.  They claimed that flaring operations had destroyed trees and other 
foliage as well as damaged houses which were located near the site.  The verdict of the case went 
in favor of the oil companies.  The judge, upon receiving word from an on scene observer, 
concluded that there was simply not enough evidence to support the claims by the plaintiffs and 
the charges were dismissed.
55
  Studies conducted to determine the exact impact of gas flaring on 
soil, flora, and fauna in the oil producing region revealed that “palm trees most of which were 
wild, that were within a radius of one kilometer of the flare sites, grew tall without bearing fruits 
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  Moreover, pumpkin and tomato crops also did not grow within the same 
one kilometer radius due to a dehydrating of the soil.   
Furthermore, regulations were set into place in 1984 to monitor and limit gas flaring 
operations; however, oil multinationals continued the practice with little or no government 
intervention.  The law was the result of an amendment to the Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 
1979.  The Act required gas to be re-injected back into the earth by the companies conducting the 
operations or for them to develop a comprehensive scheme to utilize the excess gas.  In addition 
to the NNPC’s unwillingness to invest in gas development, there were other reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of the gas flaring regulations.  First, the Nigerian government granted exemptions 
to oil companies which offered them the leeway to operate outside federal law.  In 1985, the 
same year the Gas Re-injections Act was amended, 55 of Shell’s 84 active wells were exempted 
from the flaring regulations.  Second, the monetary penalties associated with the gas flaring were 
minor, making it cheaper for companies to flare gas than it was for them to invest in gas 
development programs.
57
 To emphasize this point, it would have cost Chevron approximately 56 
million US dollars in the late 1980s to convert gas operations to be in compliance with the Gas 
Re-injection Act.  With maintaining the status-quo, the fines weighed against the company for 
flaring gas tallied roughly 1 million US dollars.
58
 It was clearly more economically beneficial for 
Chevron to continue with the operations that were already in place.  Another company operating 
and flaring gas in the area, Mobil, stated that the reason they flared gas instead of processing it 
for local use was because “the company was only authorized by law to exploit crude oil and 
nothing more.”
59
  These examples clearly showed that the Nigerian government was more 
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concerned about revenues generated from oil production then they were about implementing 
regulatory policy. 
Even with the mounting environmental problems of the 1970s and the mid-1980s, 
regulatory policies continued to absent from government programs.  It was not until 1988 that the 
Nigerian government set up an agency specifically dedicated to the development of an 
institutional framework for environmental management as a response to ecological disasters.  
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was created by the FEPA Act of 1988 
and was later amended by Act #59 in 1992.  The agency’s main functions were to analyze 
possible environmental situations and advise the government on probable catastrophic issues.  
Not only was the Agency riddled with contention and contradiction, the laws written to support 
FEPA’s mission were full of loopholes and vague language so that oil companies could continue 
to avoid liability of spills.  Above all, it was apparent that economic gain took the primary 
position over regulatory policy. 
 Nigeria’s road to political independence began almost as soon as the British colonized the 
territory at the start of the twentieth century.  With the passing of two world wars, an increasing 
number of “nationalist” movements, and a changing global political economy, Britain realized it 
was no longer feasible to continue the direct occupation of Nigeria.  Nigeria’s independence was 
achieved through a constitutional process which granted Nigerians greater participation in the 
colonial system between 1940-1960.  Nigeria’s independence constitution was, however, 
defective.  The constitution sanctioned Nigerian into three official regions.  This ensured that 
political parties would be formed along ethnic lines.  Unfortunately, this would undermine the 
creation of a Nigerian nationalist movement.  Party loyalty at the regional level was gained 
through a system of patronage that has been aptly described by Frederick Cooper as 
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“clientelism.”  The post-colonial state was also a “gate-keeper” state.  The post-colonial state did 
not break new ground; it built on the institutions and structures that had been created during the 
colonial period.  With regard to the oil industry, the policies of the post-colonial state intensified 
oil exploration and production.  The policies also ensured that Nigeria would have a greater share 
of the equity from oil revenues.  Greater share of the revenue did not translate a control of the 
technology and infrastructure of oil production.  In spite of the indigenization program that was 
implemented by the Nigerian government during the tenure of Gowon the oil corporation still 
maintained control of the most strategic areas of oil exploration and production.  Nigeria did not 
have the technological capabilities to control gas flaring nor did they have the technical expertise 
to monitor oil company operations both on shore and off shore.  In the context of the continued 
dependent relationship between Nigeria and multinational corporations, the successive 
governments of 1960-1988 failed to implement regulatory policies regarding the oil industry.  As 





CHAPTER 3: RESISTANCE AND CIVILIAN RULE 
 
Chapter three examines the time period from 1988 to the present.  This chapter analyzes 
the social and environmental consequences of over forty years of oil exploration, exploitation 
and production in Nigeria’s Niger Delta against the backdrop of important political and 
economic changes.  The outstanding feature of Nigerian history in the 1980s was the 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under the military dictatorship 
of General Babangida.  The SAP was recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and was the product of structural weaknesses in the Nigerian economy that date back to the 
colonial period.  The Nigerian economy since the mid-1970s has been dominated by an 
overdependence on crude oil exports.  The failure to diversify the Nigerian economy has made it 
vulnerable to the fluctuations in the world market.  The provisions of the SAP included but were 
not limited to the devaluation of Nigeria’s currency, the liberalization of the economy through 
the reduction of tariffs, and the deregulation of the economy through the removal of government 
controls.  The implication of SAP with regard to the activities of multinational oil companies in 
Nigeria’s oil industry was that the government would have less control over the operational 
aspects of the industry.   
This chapter argues that the non-implementation of regulatory policies by the post-
colonial Nigerian state has led to the decimation of the agricultural and marine resources of vast 
areas of Nigeria’s Niger Delta oil-production area.  The destruction of the “ecosystem” and the 
concomitant diminution of economic opportunities have created what Frederick Cooper calls 
“labor reserves.”  Deprived of a means of livelihood, large numbers of youths with nothing to 
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sell but their labor power have become key elements in the resistance to the activities of the 
multinational oil corporations in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.    
Although the resistant movements of the 1990s and 2000s have gained some attention by 
the global community, the collective message of environmental protection has been continually 
silenced by the successive Nigerian governments both military and civilian.  One of the most 
noted examples of this was the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP 
members in 1995. Furthermore, as resistant movements became more aggressive and violent in 
nature, instances of environmental destruction have increased accordingly.  Reasons vary, but 
central to this view is that the sabotage of oil production facilities and pipelines by Nigerian 
militant groups was causing damage to local ecological areas through oil spillage.  Compounding 
the problem has been the illegal sale of crude oil, or “blood oil,” on the black market with profits 
directly funding further militant activity.   
 
FEPA and the Rise of MOSOP 
As stated in the preceding chapter the main goal of the newly formed Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency was to analyze possible environmental situations and advise 
the government on probable catastrophic issues.  At the time of FEPA’s creation the Nigerian 
government was once again controlled by a military leader, General Babangida.  Nigeria’s 
Second Republic had been characterized by official corruption, ethnic tensions, and non-
implementation of government policies.  After a failed general election in 1983, the military 
seized power in a coup led by General Buhari, on December 31, 1983.  Buhari’s regime was 
overthrown a year and a half later by General Babangida who took over as head of state on 
August 27, 1985. Under the rule of the second military government since the overthrow of the 
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Second Republic in 1983, the Nigerian economy continued its downward spiral.  In an attempt to 
remedy the economic situation, Babangida implemented the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) which essentially endorsed the deregulation and privatization of the national economy. 
While some positive impacts resulted from the SAP, the overall social effects from the program 
were devastating for the average Nigerian.  With the implementation of the SAP, unemployment 
increased and governmental corruption became more institutionalized.  By 1989 there was not 
one governmental institution or agency that was not infiltrated by systematic corruption; this 
included the newly formed Federal Environmental Protection Agency. 
Federal control of FEPA created a serious conflict of interest within its internal structure 
which undermined the implementation of regulatory policies for the oil industry.  As stated in the 
preceding chapter, the Land Use Act of 1979 declared governmental responsibility of all lands in 
which oil operations were conducted. This in turn made the government liable when pollution 
occurred in those areas.  However, because the Act also specified that the government could 
legally revoke any inhabitant’s right to land, displaced persons were essentially rendered 
powerless to resist because according to the law they had no right to be on the government 
owned land in the first place.  The Land Use Act provided the government no social impetus to 
stop the destruction of the environment.  To further compromise FEPA’s central mission, and 
more profoundly the overall dynamic of Niger Delta environmental degradation, was the state’s 
ownership and influence in the Agency’s decision and policy making process. 
FEPA’s environmental protection and control objective, as created by the FEPA Act of 
1988 was inherently flawed.  The Agency’s governing council consisted of members who not 
only contributed to the environmental decisions made by the Agency; they were also 
representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.  This created a conflict of interest 
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because Ministry officials could directly influence FEPA’s regulatory policies concerning the oil 
industry.  Also, the FEPA Act itself contained certain loop holes written into the regulatory 
language that allowed for the discharge of hazardous material into the environment when and 
where it was explicitly authorized by Nigerian law.  An example of this federal authorization was 
the Oil in Navigable Waters Act which stated that a “vessel may discharge oil into Nigerian 
waters if the escape of oil was due to leakage and the leakage was not due to any want of 
reasonable care and all reasonable steps were taken to stop or reduce the discharge.”
60
  This 
example, shown by the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, destroys any deterrents FEPA created to 
manage environmental pollution. 
As a response to the devastated social and environmental conditions of Nigeria’s Delta 
Region because of decades of unregulated oil operations, the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1990 in an attempt to raise global awareness.  Through 
non-violent protest, MOSOP proactively denounced the acts of ‘genocide’ inflicted on the Delta 
people.
61
  The Ogoni people’s environmental message was clear.  In 1990, MOSOP summed up 
their list of demands for ecological, political, and socio-economic justice within the framework 
of their “Ogoni Bill of Rights”.  Along with pleas for adequate representation and a larger share 
of their territory’s oil revenue, was the demand for protection against the environmental 
degradation of their land. When the document was sent to General Babangida’s Armed Forces 
Ruling Council it received no response.  Also, no response was received when MOSOP 
contacted local oil producers, Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) and demanded compensation in the amount of 4 billion US dollars for the 
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environmental destruction caused to their territory, as well as 6 billion US dollars in outstanding 
taxes and royalties.  This apparent neglect demonstrated the agenda of the Nigerian government 
and the oil companies.  When MOSOP’s demands gained the attention of the international 
community, Nigeria’s military government stepped in to silence their opposition voice. 
In the concluding months of 1995, nine members of MOSOP were convicted of murder, 
and subsequently sentenced to death by hanging.  The nine prisoners were initially taken into 
custody for their alleged involvement in the murder of four Ogoni leaders in May, 1994.  For 
more than eight months the defendants were tortured, beaten, and forced to live incommunicado 
from the rest of society.  In addition, the prisoners were regularly deprived of adequate food, 
water, and medical attention.  Among the nine MOSOP members convicted was organization 
president, and acclaimed author and environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.  The Ogoni 
nine’s executions in 1995 marked the culmination of negative impact the oil industry has had on 
the natural and social environments of Nigeria’s Niger Delta. 
The Babangida administration began the process for the transition to civilian rule almost 
as soon as he took power in January 1986.  In 1989, the military government released a draft of 
the new constitution that would be implemented by the Third Republic.  Elections were held on 
June 12, 1993 and were considered by the Nigerian people as the most free, fair, and peaceful 
elections in Nigeria to date.  With the prospect of having to relinquish power, Babangida 
annulled the results of the elections on June 23, and subsequently remained in power.  
Babangida’s actions generated an explosion of protests, demonstrations, and riots across Nigeria.  
The uprising diverged along regional lines, where protestors in the South called for a restoration 
of results from the June 12
th
 elections while in the North, pro-Babangida rallies were organized 
by the government.  As a result, widespread violence broke out and a state of emergency was 
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declared in many parts of the nation.  Babangida, under the crisis conditions, could no longer 
hold legitimacy and was removed from his position by a military coup on November 17, 1993. 
General Sani Abacha assumed power and quickly established has name as a ruthless and 
authoritarian leader.  Abacha showed no signs of relinquishing power and abolished all the 
existing measures and institutions created by the Third Republic’s constitution. The Ogoni trials 
solidified Abacha’s reputation for brutality. Prior to his 1995 conviction, Ken Saro-Wiwa was 
harassed and arrested multiple times by Abacha’s security forces, including two separate 
occasions in 1993 for unlawful assembly, seditious intention, and seditious publication.  
Concurrently while Saro-Wiwa and the other accused MOSOP members awaited trial, 
governmental security forces instigated inter-ethnic killings where no redemptive legal action 
was brought upon them.
62
  During the month of June 1994, more than fifty Ogoni were executed 
by military security forces as well as over 180 wounded during village attacks in Rivers State.
63
  
During these attacks security forces were reported to have fired their weapons at random, looted 
property, and burned local homes.  In the village of Uegwere Bo-ue specifically, two separate 
attacks occurred within four days of each other, resulting in nine dead, one of which was a 10-
year-old boy.   
The accusations and convictions brought against Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP 
activists were undoubtedly politically motivated.  Proof of this reality can be seen when placed 
within the context of the murderous events which occurred in Rivers State during the previous 
five years. Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP activists were detained illegally without 
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formal charges from the time they were initially apprehended in May 1994 until February 6, 
1995 when the first five were brought to court and notified of the charges weighed against them.  
A special court, named the Civil Disturbances Tribunal, was established by Nigeria’s military 
government to try cases in connection with civil unrest.
64
  The tribunal acted more as an arm of 
government than a court of law.  To further emphasize the view that the MOSOP nine’s case was 
politically motivated, the tribunal’s verdicts had no official effect until confirmed and amended 
by the government.  Additionally, according to the Nigerian constitution, within the rights of 
Nigerian citizenship, the defendants should have been notified of their charges within twenty-
four hours of arrest, which never took place.   In addition to political motivation, the tribunal also 
made decisions and verdicts that were proven to be directly influenced by governmental entities 
working outside the Nigerian judicial system.  
 From the time of initial arrest in May 1994, the military government controlled every 
aspect of the Ogoni nine’s detainment and trial.  The members of this specially appointed 
tribunal included both high and lower ranking military officers, and even though chaired by a 
retired judge, the selected members of the court shockingly were not required to possess any 
legal training.  In addition, the military officers who served on the tribunal were directly 
influenced by governmental authorities as their employment, promotion opportunities, and 
pensions, were dependent on successful and effective military service.  Perhaps the most publicly 
transparent example of the military government’s control and prejudgment was displayed with 
the initiative to go to trial.  The decision to proceed to trial was confirmed before prosecution 
applied for commencement of the first trial which was on January 28, 1995.  The federal 
government announced that the trial would commence before any suspect was formally charged 
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as well as before the prosecution presented any evidence for the tribunal to review.
65
 Also, the 
tribunal’s final verdict held no legal authority until either accepted or rejected by federal 
government officials.  Therefore, the decision could be made in isolation from the pressure of 
public judicial or legal processes. 
The subjective stance demonstrated by the tribunal directly conflicted with the 
international standards for fair and just trial proceedings.  With the case of the Ogoni nine, the 
tribunal conducted two trials simultaneously.  This was not only prejudicial to all of the 
defendants involved, but it also exposed an absence of equality and adherence to the basic citizen 
rights protected within the legal framework of Nigeria’s Federal Constitution.
66
  Andrew Rowell 
of Greenpeace observed that “the Ogoni’s situation may seem more about human rights than the 
environment.  After all, Nigeria has a history of puppet dictators, military rule and has denied its 
people democratic elections and minority rights.”
67
 While accurate with his assertion of human 
rights violations, Rowell overlooked a principal certainty that, “[e]nvironmental and human 
rights for the Nigerian people, particularly in the Niger Delta, cannot be separated.”
68
  The tragic 
fate of the Ogoni nine exposed to the global community considerably more than a story about the 
suppression of human rights by a corrupt judicial and political system.  It revealed the extent the 
Nigerian military government, would go to in order to silence opposition voice for the 
environmental destruction caused from decades of conducting oil operations in the Niger Delta. 
Abacha’s regime not only blatantly disregarded human rights, but also engaged in corrupt 
political and economic activities that would continue to sustain poor living conditions for the 
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Nigerian people.  Abacha died on June 8, 1998 from an apparent heart attack and power was 
handed over to General Abubakar.  Abubakar made steps toward the transition to civilian rule 
and as a result Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president of the new Fourth Republic on May 29, 
1999 with Abubakar as his vice president.  Although the elections of 1999 were widely agreed to 
have been corrupted by vote rigging by all parties, the prospect of ending abusive military rule 
overshadowed the concerns over the legitimacy of the elections.  Although the economic policies 
of Obasanjo did help somewhat to improve Nigeria’s reputation within the global community, on 
the domestic level Nigeria was still stricken by massive poverty and environmental degradation.     
The prolonged degradation of the environment began to be perceived by many Nigerians 
living in the oil producing Delta as environmental terrorism.  As one Delta resident reported,  
“Since this year there has been two major oil spills in my village of K. Dere alone,  
destroying farms and marine life, but as we speak, the rivers, streams and farms are still  
covered in the oil spills. It is this grave, odious, pervasive if not callous environmental  
terrorism that should elevate what is happening to our environment to the realm of crimes  
against nature, and punished as such.”
69
   
 
More than a decade after the tragic executions of the Ogoni Nine, similar environmental 
language resurfaced.  The claimed acts of environmental terrorism parallel the acts of genocide 
declared by Ken Saro-Wiwa.  Furthermore, the environmental and social situations were 
blatantly disregarded by both the Nigerian state as well as the multinational oil companies 
operating in the Niger River basin underscoring their collaboration. 
A Niger Delta resident explained to a reporter,"[t]hree weeks ago, we discovered some 
black substances in our river, which we later found out was oil spill from an SPDC [Shell 
Petroleum Development Company] pipeline at Okpare-Olomu.” He continued, “We then 
wrote a letter to SPDC through Mr. Temu Aghwarentefe, the Community Relations 
Officer who later directed us to another office. But up to this moment, we have not heard 
from management of the company"
70
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Similar testimonies of negligence and damage to local fishing and agricultural areas by 
Shell were widespread across the oil producing regions of the Niger Delta.  Nigerian 
environmental rights activist Dr. Godwin Uyi-Ojo was accurate in stating “environmental 
degradation fuels underdevelopment and greed”
71
  Poor environmental conditions added to the 
overall social frustration of the Niger Delta population. 
 
Sabotage 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, sabotage of oil sites and pipelines continued to be a 
major problem for not only the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals operating in the 
area, but also the ecology of oil producing-regions of the Niger Delta.  A popular view among 
academic scholars and the media was the Niger Delta people were reacting to the recklessness of 
the Nigerian government and oil companies in the native communities.  Militant groups have 
formed as a way to respond to environmental destruction caused by oil operations and 
governmental oppression.  These groups act with tremendous force striking oil instillations with 
the intent of kidnaping oil employees and ciphering oil for sale on the black market.  The stolen 
oil is referred to as blood oil and the profit from this theft funds these militant groups’ 
acquisition of weapons and ammunitions.
72
  Since an overwhelming number of these acts of 
sabotage happen in remote areas beyond the capability of surveillance equipment, untold damage 
has occurred to the complex land and water systems of the Niger Delta.
73
  Sabotage adds a new 
and multifaceted dynamic to the study of environmental degradation in Nigeria’s oil-bearing 
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region.  Militant groups, mainly comprised of Niger Delta residents, are willfully destroying their 
own environment as a way to demonstrate to the oil companies and the government that they are 
frustrated with political corruption and lack of safeguards against environmental destruction. 
The resistance movements generated by the trade of blood oil differ starkly from those 
which began with the formation of MOSOP in the early 1990s; however, the collective message 
is similar.
74
  MOSOP was formed to represent the shared voice of the exploited Delta people.  
With Saro-Wiwa as their movement leader, they organized non-violent protests which fought 
against the destruction of the environment by oil multinationals.  Similar to how the British 
colonial government was quick to silence opposition to colonial rule, the Nigerian government 
did not hesitate to intervene on behalf of the oil industry rather than its own people because of 
the prospect of quick money.  The resistance and violence that has formed as a reaction to 
environmental degradation and the oppression of basic human rights by the Nigerian government 
working closely with oil multinationals has essentially left the population of Nigeria’s oil-
bearing region in a state of perpetual despair. The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight 
MOSOP leaders represent the culmination of negative impacts the oil industry has had on the 
physical and social environments of the Niger Delta. 
The formation of the terrorist group the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta 
(MEND) in late 2005 epitomizes the militant reaction against the oppressive actions of the 
government and oil companies.  It is also a product of the social and economic problems created 
by the destruction of the environment of the Niger Delta by the multinational corporations.  
According to Jomo Gbomo, a representative of one of MEND’s branches, the majority of the 
group’s members are volunteers and are not limited to the Ijaw ethnic group.  He goes further to 
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say that members come from different communities across the Niger Delta oil-producing area 
such as Urhobo, Ikwerri, and Itsekiri.
75
  This reflects the fact that the resistance to the operations 
of the oil companies is not influenced by ethnic factors but rather by social and economic 
concerns. The available historical sources suggest that a vast majority of the MEND militants are 
unemployed youths.
76
  According to MEND leaders, the group was formed from a number of 
smaller Niger Delta militant organizations as a way to draw greater media attention to the Niger 
Delta situation.  The group recognized that one semi-united faction could generate more media 
coverage than several smaller groups could.   
MEND’s ultimate goals are “for the Niger Delta people to receive a greater share of the 
Niger Delta’s oil and natural gas revenues, to end corruption in the Niger Delta 
governments, and for the release of Niger Delta militants that have been arrested by the 
Nigerian military and police.”
77
   
 
MEND is especially noted for their violent attacks on oil facilities and oil personnel 
working in the Niger Delta.  Their first recorded violent operation was on Shell Oil Company’s 
Opobo pipeline, located in Delta State on December 20, 2005.  MEND’s power derives from its 
lack of formal structure.  It is essentially an umbrella organization with a decentralized power 
structure and open membership.  Moreover, militants frequently operate in small groups with 
many leaders claiming responsibility for the violent attacks; however, when missions require 
greater participation, MEND easily acquires the needed volunteers from the pool of unemployed 
youths.  Because of MEND’s fractured, yet effective autonomy, it makes it extremely difficult 
for Nigerian governmental police forces to launch counter-attacks against the group.   
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As a result of the continuous attacks by MEND and other militant groups in the Delta 
Region, a recent report conducted by the Research Institute of Economic and Peace marked 
Nigeria as the sixth most dangerous nation in Africa.  The report took into account the risk of 
renewed fighting, the resurgence of political instability, and terrorist threats.
78
  In an attempt to 
curb the violence generated by MEND, the Nigerian government implemented an amnesty 
program on June 25, 2009.  The program granted unconditional amnesty to militants in the Niger 
Delta and also established a training and development program for recovering youths.  As it 
were, over 25,000 former militants participated in the program; however, the violence continues 
between governmental security forces and armed gangs in the Niger Delta region. In 2006 alone, 
there were over 200 reported kidnappings of oil workers.  According to Soni Daniel, between 
2006 and 2008, “the militants had through a combination of strategies-bombing of oil facilities, 
bunkering, kidnapping and harassment of oil workers cut Nigeria’s oil supply by over one 
million barrels per day and caused significant setback to the industry and the nation’s 
economy.”
79
   
The environmental and political damages caused as a result of the blood oil trade, 
militant activity, and governmental and oil company neglect, has generated serious social 
consequences for the Niger Delta people. Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has 
drastically affected social relations, migration trends, and national perception.   
According to a study by Nigerian scholar V.T. Jike, “the consequences of social  
disequilibrium (e.g., the ubiquity of social miscreants [area boys], juvenile delinquents,  
and other deviant behaviors) cannot be understood independently of environmental  
problems that stem from warped development initiative that roundly undermines the  
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existential base of the Niger-Delta peoples.”
80
   
 
Indeed, environmental degradation has led to urban overcrowding as a result of migrations out of 
the Delta region because reckless oil operations have created an unlivable environment.  Groups 
of rebellious youths have formed who fight against organized authority fueled by a collective 
feeling of powerlessness.  A new sense of class-consciousness has been created which is 
emphasized through the combined conception of economic deprivation and environmental 
degradation.
81
  These migrations are influencing social relation within Nigeria’s already 
overpopulated cities.  They have caused increased levels of violence and insecurity in urban 
centers.
82
   
Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has not only affected social equilibrium 
and urban demographics, but also traditional ideals of paternalism among the people of the Niger 
Delta.  Jike explains that because of the unrelenting exploitation of natural resources, activism 
within the communities has created a resilient sub-culture composed of village youths.  He 
further claims that the new youth, the ones that observed their fathers having their lands stolen 
and exploited in front of them, are migrating to urban centers or joining militant movements.   
Chief Inegite of a village community located near Oloibiri claims that “[p]rolonged 
disappointment and post-colonial generational change had bred Delta youths who were 
angrier, louder and more assertively militant that their fathers.” Inegite further adds that 
“none of us, old or young, big or small, is happy about this. But we are happy that, unlike 
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There are mixed opinions of the situation in the Niger Delta.  Paradoxically, local people 
react to the oil companies’ blatant neglect of Nigerian environmental laws, by breaking the law 
themselves; acquiring oil illegally through bunkering operations.  When their resistance efforts 
get obstructed by Nigerian police forces, it demonstrates to the population that they are 
essentially being disciplined for performing tasks that should be the responsibility of the 
government.
84
  Moreover, blood oil bunkering has not only negatively impacted the Nigerian 
environment it also affected the economy both on the domestic and international level, 
challenged social orders, and sustained corruption within Nigerian political structures. Although 
the actions the militants are performing are against the law as well as counterproductive to the 
cleanup of the environment, they still carry with them a powerful message concerning the 
government and oil industries’ neglect of safety and environmental regulations.  Evidenced by 
the politics involved with the clean-up and compensation decisions as a result of the massive 
offshore oil spill by Shell oil company in late 2011.   
In December, 2011 approximately 40,000 barrels of crude oil were released into the 
marine environment 75 miles off the coast of the Niger Delta while conducting transfer 
operations from a floating oil platform to a tanker.  Satellite observation of the spill estimated a 
contaminated area of 70 kilometers long and covering over 923 square kilometers of surface 
water area.
85
  To add context to the oil spillage problem, the U.N. conducted a study in 2011 
producing truly staggering results.  In the U.N. report, Shell and the Nigerian Government were 
criticized “for contributing to 50 years of pollution in a region of the Niger Delta which it says 
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needs the world’s largest ever oil clean-up, costing an initial $1 billion and taking up to 30 
years.”
86
   
The mid-1980s witnessed the IMF inspired Structural Adjustment Programme. The SAP 
had considerable negative consequences for the Nigerian economy.  It led to widespread 
unemployment, increased inflation, and deepening poverty in not only urban centers but also 
rural areas.  It was characterized by immense political change as evidenced by the seizure of 
power by the military in 1986, then again in 1993, and then the return to democratic rule in 1999.  
Although the successive governments in Nigeria instituted certain regulatory policies, such as the 
FEPA act, they were not properly implemented.  The continued assault on the Niger Delta 
environment by an unregulated oil industry has led to the rise of not only non-violent political 
activism, but also militant uprisings against the activities of multinationals and the Nigerian 
state.   Resistance movements have taken many forms since Nigeria’s transition from Abacha’s 
brutal military rule to the civilian run Forth Republic.  Under the Abacha regime the most noted 
example of social oppression and injustice was seen by the unwarranted execution of the Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP members in 1995.  Furthermore, as the resistant 
movements of the late 1990s and 2000s became more aggressive and violent in nature, instances 
of environmental destruction have increased accordingly.  Since the formation of the terrorist 
group MEND there have been hundreds of violent attacks against oil facilities and personnel.  
These attacks have led to the tremendous loss of revenue for both Nigeria and the oil 
multinationals operating in the area.   
The unfortunate reality of the situation is that oil and gas operations in Nigeria continue 
to be controlled by multinational companies and are sustained with the backing and support of 
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the Nigerian state.  Judicial scholar Paul Ocheje states “[a]s developments in Nigeria have 
demonstrated law and the legal order can be manipulated in order to sustain the state and a 
section of the society at the expense of the general public.”
87
  Nigeria as a whole could greatly 
benefit from an investment and adherences to the laws its federal government enacts.  “Nigeria 
has the second highest level of flaring in the world, after Russia; and in most countries the excess 
gas is collected and used to generate power.  A World Bank report said the market value of gas 
flared annually in Nigeria is between $500 million and $2.5 billion US dollars.”
88
        
Efforts to remedy the situation are slow going, but pressure from the community is 
helping the process gain momentum.  Described in a recent article on gas flaring, as a result of 
public outcry, Shell Company is investing money toward limiting the amount of gas flaring 
operations in the Niger Delta from their oil wells. Shell stated this is an attempt to upgrade 
equipment which will hopefully start a trend among the other oil companies in the area. This 
article, like many similar ones highlighting altruistic intentions by multinationals, must be read 
with a careful scrutiny.
89
  While Shell claims a reduction in flaring operations, Ben Amunwa 
from the international human rights NGO platform stated that statistics from Shell’s current 
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While historical scholarship has excellently detailed the Nigerian oil industry, there has 
been no in-depth study of environmental degradation relating to the oil producing region of the 
Niger Delta over the full range of time from the colonial era to post-independence period.  The 
economic and political policies instituted during British colonial rule led to a post-independence 
Nigerian economy deeply dependent on the technological equipment and financial backing of 
multinational oil companies.  Once the British colonial administration established control and the 
governing system of indirect rule was implemented, the British took systematic steps to gain 
control of Nigeria’s raw materials.  The conditions established during the late colonial period, 
marked by Britain’s economic and technological superiority did little to enhance sustainable 
technological development in Nigeria.  As a result the multinational oil corporations have 
dominated the entire spectrum of the Nigeria’s oil industry from oil exploration to oil production.   
The Colonial Minerals Ordinance of 1914 as well as an inadequate educational system 
helped to sustain the British monopolistic control of crude oil exploration in the Niger Delta 
during the late colonial period.  Because of this, Nigeria as an independent nation would 
transition from colonial rule deficient in the technology and appropriate skill sets to effectively 
exploit its oil resources.  This left Nigeria dependent on foreign economies and multinational oil 
companies which possessed the equipment and technological skill to extract and produce 
Nigeria’s oil resources.  While regulations were passed regarding resource control during the 
colonial period, the British created no safeguards against environmental damage.  This situation 
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would get exponentially worse after 1956, when oil was discovered for the first time in 
commercial quantities.   
Nigerian politics went through incredible changes following independence in 1960.  This 
would first occur from 1965 to 1970, and then again from 1979 to 1986.  During these two 
periods Nigeria’s political landscape was beleaguered by ethnic politics, political corruption, and 
the seizure of power by the military.  The tensions in Nigerian politics would boil over in 1967 in 
a civil war which left between one and three million Nigerians dead.  Not only did the War leave 
a significant political legacy by maintaining a military run government in the aftermath, but it 
also had tremendous consequences for Nigeria’s oil industry, natural environment, and social 
communities.   
With the appeal of quick money, successive governments in Nigeria promoted the speedy 
expansion of the oil industry in a regulatory vacuum.  The Nigerian government, besides, lacked 
the monitoring mechanisms to effectively oversee the oil industry with concerns relating to 
environmental protection.  Although legislative acts were passed during this time, they were not 
properly implemented as a result of inherent contradictions, administrative inefficiency, and the 
weakness of the Nigerian post-colonial state.  With vague language, oil legislation more often 
favored oil producers and foreign entities over the Nigerian people.  In short, in the aftermath of 
political independence, the multinational oil corporations operating in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
were essentially left to monitor themselves.  
It was not until 1988 that the Nigerian government enacted a law creating an 
environmental regulatory agency with the specific goal of environmental protection.  While 
Nigeria’s Federal Environmental Protection Agency’s (FEPA) agenda was aimed at 
environmental management, like many other governmental agencies in Nigeria, corruption and 
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monetary gain trumped the effectiveness of its mission.  The continued failure to implement 
regulations guiding Nigeria’s oil industry has generated uprisings among the populations of the 
most exploited areas.  While the resistance movements of the 1990s and 2000s have gained some 
attention by the global community, the collective message of environmental protection has been 
continually silenced by the successive Nigerian governments both military and civilian.  In 1995, 
MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members were unjustly executed.  In the wake of 
the executions resistance movements across the Delta Region became more aggressive and 
violent in nature and instances of environmental destruction increased accordingly.  The late 
1990s saw an increase in cases of sabotage on oil production facilities and pipelines by Nigerian 
militant groups which caused damage to local ecological areas through oil spillage.  
Compounding the problem was the illegal sale of crude oil, or “blood oil,” on the black market 
with profits directly funding further militant activity.  While some measures have been taken to 
curb the continued destruction of the environment, progress has been slow.  Undoubtedly, 
decades of British rule created the conditions that ultimately rendered successive Nigerian 
governments deeply dependent on foreign entities leaving the Niger Delta people to suffer the 
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